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Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of designing a strategy profile which will enable collaborative
interaction between agents. In particular, we consider the problem of information sharing among
agents. Providing information in a single interaction as a response to queries is often nonbeneficial.
But there are stable strategy profiles that make sharing information beneficial in the long run. This
paper presents these types of mechanisms and specifies under which conditions it is beneficial to
the agents to answer queries. We analyze a model of repeated encounters in which two agents ask
each other queries over time. We present different strategies that enable information exchange, and
compare them according to the expected utility for the agents, and the conditions required for the
cooperative equilibrium to exist.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider the problem of enabling helpful behavior of agents, for
situations where helpful behavior is not beneficial in the short run. We consider situations
where an agent can ask for help from another agent. However, if no help was received, the
agent cannot observe whether the other agent attempted to help or not. The asking agent
(B) needs the help of the other agent (A), but this help is costly for A. Furthermore, we
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consider situations where no payment mechanism exists to compensate an agent for its help
(for example, information agents that do not charge money for using them, or information
agents of private persons). Thus, each agent will be motivated to get help, but has no
motivation to provide any help to its opponent. This type of problem appears in information
sharing among self-motivated agents. Information sharing is necessary in environments
where autonomous agents are required to solve problems, and additional information may
improve their performance, i.e., reputation systems, load balancing, reviewing papers,
solving problems which require specialization, etc. Information sharing among agents in
such environments is supposed to increase their average utility, since the cost of one agent
to find an answer to a query is usually less than the utility derived by the agent receiving
the response.
Research on information sharing among agents usually assumes that the agents are
motivated to share information with each other and to help each other to find the best
solution to their problems [10,14,22]. This assumption does not hold in multi-agent
environments, where each agent belongs to another owner, who wants to maximize its
own utility. When answering a query an agent bears the costs of searching for the answer
and sending it to the questioner, and it may also bear indirect costs. For example, if the
query is about the resource with the lowest load [16], answering it may increase the load
of the resource, and this can harm the responding agent that publicized this information.
The responding agent does not receive any payment for its answer, since there is no
mechanism to enable such a payment. Moreover, the value of an answer cannot objectively
be evaluated. Payment for answers may reduce the efficiency of the overall system since an
agent may give up on sending queries, only because its estimation about the benefits from
them is too low.
Given the above domain, each agent would like to receive answers to its own queries,
while ignoring queries directed to it. Thus, as we show in Section 3.2 below, it is clear
that in equilibrium of a single interaction no agent will answer any query. However, if the
interactions are repeated, strategy profiles exist in which it is worthwhile for the agents to
attempt to answer queries, since their long term utility will increase. In these strategies an
agent that does not answer a query is punished by the inquiring agent. The punishment is
implemented by ignoring queries of the punished agents.
To simplify the problem, we analyze a model of repeated interactions in which two
agents contact each other and repeatedly ask queries. We check under which conditions it
will be worthwhile for an agent to answer the queries of its opponent. In order to consider
the general case where several agents are connected, each pair of agents can be analyzed
separately. Furthermore, the benefits of an answer obtained by a certain agent should be
evaluated given the fact that answers can also be obtained by other agents.
The problem of enabling cooperation in answering queries is different from the classical
prisoner’s dilemma [8] with respect to two main issues. First, the agents do not make their
decisions simultaneously: in each interaction, one agent asks a query, and a decision is
made by the second agent. Second, an agent, when attempting to answer a query, may fail
to find an answer, and the questioner cannot know whether it did not receive an answer
because the other agent ignored its query, or because the other agent failed to find an
answer. The agent which has to answer may consider to send a message indicating that
it failed to find an answer. However, such a response is strategically equal in our model
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to not responding, since in that case, the questioner cannot know whether the agent really
attempted to answer its query or not. We also assume that an agent cannot send a fictive
answer, since such an answer will be immediately revealed. For example, in the commerce
domain, information about a seller cannot be given if the informer does not know actual
details about it. Similarly, technical help which is not useful will immediately be found to
be worthless, etc.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of related work on
artificial society and on reputation mechanisms. Section 3 describes the basic model of
information sharing. First, we consider the case in which an agent punishes the other agent
each time the other agent has not responded to its query, which is presented in Section 4.
In Section 5 we consider the general case, in which the n last queries presented to agent A
are observed in order to decide whether to punish agent A. Finally, Section 6 provides the
conclusions and suggests directions for future research. The paper’s proofs and a table of
symbols appear in appendices.
2. Related work
This paper deals with enabling information sharing among two agents. The motivation
behind this issue is in the formation of societies of agents which share information. We
claim that agents share information with each other due to the fact that interactions are
repeated, and equilibrium can be based on punishment which is implemented by ignoring
queries of the punished agents. In this section, we survey related work on two issues. We
present previous work on interactions of agents in repeated games in Section 2.1, and in
Section 2.2 we discuss the previous work on gathering and sharing information among self
interested agents.
2.1. Cooperation among self interested entities
Research conducted in DAI concerning cooperation and coordination in repeated games
deals mainly with learning the best strategy to play in this kind of game. The typical
approach is to assume that the adversary’s strategy is a member of some natural class of
computationally bounded strategies. In this section we describe related work on strategies
and learning techniques used by agents in repeated games.
Axelrod’s model [2] of the evolution of cooperation was based on the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma. He considered a group of players playing the prisoner’s dilemma repeatedly,
thereby permitting partial time histories of behavior to guide future decisions. He found
that a very simple strategy called “tit for tat” was the winning strategy. This strategy simply
cooperates on the first move and then does whatever the opponent has done in the previous
move. In our problem, we use a variation of tit-for-tat, adapted to the queries answering
domain when actions are not formed simultaneously.
Sandholm and Lesser [15] suggest that agents use Q-learning [9] in repeated games, in
order to learn how to play optimally against an unknown opponent. In their simulations,
agents using a Q-learning algorithm succeed in learning to play optimally against tit-
for-tat agents, but they face difficulties when playing against other learners. The agents
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which fared best among the Q-learning agents, in the iterative prisoners dilemma, were
agents with learning based on lookup table memories, with long history windows and
long exploration schedules. In our work, we study a game different from the prisoners
dilemma, and we study agents using deterministic strategies rather than learning methods.
Nonetheless, in our research we also found that agents observing longer histories obtain
higher expected utilities.
Carmel and Markovitch [5] described a model-based approach for learning in multi-
agent systems, which split the learning process into two separate stages. In the first
stage, the learning agent infers a model of the other agents based on past interaction. In
the second stage, the agent utilizes the learned model for designing effective interaction
strategy for the future. In their simulation, the model-based agents outperform the Q-agents
significantly in learning to play against random opponents.
Freund et al. [7] present efficient algorithms for learning to play two types of repeated
games: penny-matching and contract games. They consider two new types of adversaries:
recent history adversaries, whose current action is determined by some simple Boolean
formula of the recent history of the game, and statistical adversaries, whose current action
is determined by some simple function of the statistics of the entire history of the game.
For both classes of adversaries, they developed efficient algorithms for learning to play
contract games. Finally, they consider the classical finite automata adversaries, and present
an efficient algorithm for learning to play any game against any finite automata.
Sen and Sekaran [18] consider the problem of coordinating automated agents, both in
cooperative and non-cooperative domains. They investigate a robot navigation problem
and a resource sharing problem, and apply the Q-learning algorithm to both domains.
They reveal that agents can learn to achieve their goals in both cooperative and adversarial
domains. They also reveal that classifier systems achieve near-optimal solutions quicker
than Q-learning, but for more rigid convergence criteria, they achieve a better solution than
Q-learning, only when using a larger number of trials.
Parkes and Ungar [12] review possible models of learning in multi-agent systems. They
show the influence of learning on the compensation mechanism, which is a mechanism for
an efficient coordination of actions within a multi-agent system.
Sen and Arora [17] propose a scheme for learning to identify and exploit the weakness
of a particular opponent by repeatedly playing against it over several games. They propose
an expected utility maximization strategy which allows players to benefit by taking
calculated risks that are avoided by the traditional min-max strategy. Their proposed
mechanism improves the ability of the computer player to play more effectively against
a weaker opponent.
The research described above considers learning about your opponent in a simple game
which repeats itself. Our research also deals with repeated games, but we take the classic
game theory approach of finding whenever a pair of strategies is an equilibrium. Thus, we
do not deal with learning the strategy of the opponent, but rather with identifying stable
strategies and finding the best strategy to be taken by each agent given its opponent’s
strategy and vice versa.
Chalasani et al. [6] developed a model where querying agents send queries to
information agents. They designed a randomized symmetric strategy which minimizes the
expected completion time of a query. However, they do not explain the motivation of an
R. Azoulay-Schwartz, S. Kraus / Artificial Intelligence 154 (2004) 43–93 47
agent to use the symmetric strategy. In our research, we also consider information agents,
but the strategy profiles considered are proved to be in equilibrium. We combine theoretical
proofs with particular examples that demonstrate the behavior of the strategy profiles for
particular parameters.
2.2. Sharing information in an artificial society
Certain research in economics and in DAI concerns the operation of gathering
information about several topics. In this section, we survey related work on this issue.
The common attribute of the research below is the fact that the agents are connected in
a distributed network (or society) and they learn from each other about external issues.
This learning may be done explicitly, by sharing information, or implicitly, by observing
actions.
Bala and Goyal [4] theoretically analyzed a model in which payoffs from different
actions are unknown, and the agents decide which action to use according to their own
and their neighbors’ past experience. They prove that in the long run, agents belonging
to the same connected society will choose actions with the same payoff. They also prove
that if a ‘Royal family’ (a small set of agents who are observed by every agent) exists
then there is a positive probability that the society will eventually choose a sub-optimal
action. However, in the absence of a ‘royal family’, in the long run the society will choose
the optimal action. This result demonstrates that distribution of information sharing is
important, and the existence of a central knowledge source may cause sub-optimal results.
Bala and Goyal also studied the conditions for different groups of agents to decide to take
different actions (having the same payoffs) in the long run. Finally, they simulate a group of
farmers learning the productivity of a new crop, in order to study the temporal and spatial
patterns of diffusion.
Mor [10] developed a theoretical reputation model. In his model, there is one agent α,
that plays against agents from group A. Agent α plays the Prisoner’s Dilemma against
a player from A, and it may defect or cooperate with the agent. An agent in A informs
other agents in A when it is damaged by α. Mor proves that in such a system, beneficial
defection by α is intractable, i.e., it is an NPC problem for α to find a game sequence
in which it receives a higher payoff than its payoff when it always cooperates. Mor also
specifies a scheme of behavior of the agents in group A in which beneficial defection by
agent α is intractable. Mor assumes that the agents in A are cooperative. In our research
we deal with the stability of information sharing, and this includes the case of cooperation
inside group A, assuming that each of the agents in the group is self motivated.
Seredynski [21] studies a model of N -person repeated games in which the interaction
between agents can be represented by a ring. It is assumed that each player acts in the game
independently and selects his action to maximize his payoff. To develop a global behavior
in the system Seredynski applied two Approaches; the first is a loosely coupled genetic
algorithm, and the second is a loosely coupled classifier system. Seredynski applied the
developed evolutionary system to solve two problems: the dynamic mapping problem and
the scheduling problem.
Sen [20] developed an adaptive probabilistic policy for agents in open environments.
He developed a probabilistic reciprocity scheme of strategies to be used by self-interested
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agents to decide on whether or not to help other agents. Experiments show that agents can
use reciprocal behavior to adapt to the environment, and improve individual performance.
He showed that if the group composition changes only slowly, and there is interaction
between the agents, probabilistic reciprocity based strategies can maximize the utility of
each of the agents. He also found by simulations that in the long run, selfish agents perform
worse than reciprocative agents in a mixed group.
Sen et al. [19] considered agents that share their opinions concerning other agents. Using
simulations they showed that sharing information on experiences with other agents among
reciprocative agents will limit the exploitative gains of selfish agents. They provided a
trust-based evaluation function and showed that this function resists both individual and
group deception on the part of selfish agents.
In our research, we consider a similar problem of agents that require the help of
each other. We develop strategies for stable cooperation, and find under which conditions
cooperation is possible. The agents’ strategies, in contrast to the work of Sen, are
deterministic, since we found that the performance is better than that of mixed strategies.
Moreover, we prove theoretically that the strategies are in equilibrium, i.e., no agent can
gain from deviation.
Aoyagi [1] studies a model of a two armed bandit process played by several players,
where they can observe the actions of other players, but not the outcome of these actions.
He proved that under a certain restriction on the probability of Distribution of the arms,
the players will settle on the same arm in any Nash equilibrium of the game. This shows
that each agent learns from the behavior of the other agents, even if explicit information is
not delivered. In our research, we do not assume that the players can observe the actions
of each other, so explicit information is required in order to learn from the other players’
experiences.
Zacharia [22] investigates a mechanism called Histos, which is based on information
sharing among human societies. The mechanism is founded on the idea that I am probably
willing to trust my friend’s opinion about the (unknown) user more than the opinion of a
few people I have never interacted with. Histos uses a pairwise rating of the users. The
rating is represented by a directed weighted graph. Nodes represent users and weighted
edges represent reputation ratings. When a user A0 submits a query to Histos asking about
the reputation value of user A1, the system finds all directed paths connecting A0 to A1,
of a length less or equal to N . Then a personalized reputation value for A1 is computed.
The reputation of A1 is a weighted average of the reputation values given to A1 by users
which are directly connected to it. The weight given to each user is its own reputation. This
evaluation is based on the assumption that if somebody trusts user x as a buyer or a seller,
he will also trust it as an information supplier about other users. One of the limitations of
this model is the fact that people need to have incentives in order to send their evaluation
of others, and a traditional reputation mechanism does not provide such incentives. In this
paper, we consider the stability of sharing such information between the software agents.
In the above research, the issue of learning from each other is considered. In most of the
research surveyed, it is assumed that agents explicitly share information with each other
and use information from each other in order to learn common issues. In this research, we
study the issue of stability of the sharing information process itself, in environments where
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providing information to another agent is costly, but there is no payment mechanism and
no valuations of the obtained answers.
3. Methodology
In this section, we present definitions of notions and concepts which will be used in
the models that we developed in this work. We describe the basic costs and benefits
due to queries answering. In addition, we present the stage game, which considers one
period of the game, in which one agent asks another agent a single query, and no future
encounters are considered. Then, we suggest a trigger strategy equilibrium [8] to be used
by the agents in the repeated game. This kind of strategy is appropriate for cases where
the action performed by one agent is unobserved by the other one, but the action yields
an outcome observed by both players. However, the same outcome may be the result of
different actions.
The trigger strategies are based on the ability to “punish” an agent that does not answer
queries and a trigger equilibrium is based on trigger strategies. In this type of equilibrium,
the agent will use the outcome of its opponent’s action in order to decide whether or not to
punish its opponent.
We suggest that agent B punish agent A, by ignoring a future query (or queries) of
agent A. However, in order to find out the cost of such a punishment to agent A, we will
first consider the discount factor of the punishment. Thus, in this section we also develop
the structure of the discount factor over time, which will be used in the different models
we will develop.
3.1. Notation conventions
As this paper involves several kinds of models, it includes extensive notation. In Ap-
pendix A we present a table which contains the basic notation used in this paper. In the
following paragraphs, we describe some of the basic criteria used to choose these nota-
tions.
In general, we consider a pair of agents and denote them agent A and agent B . When
considering an arbitrary agent, we denote it as agent i , communicating with agent j = i .
Any terminology related to the expected utility of an agent is described in uppercase letters
(E,U,V or F ), with a subscript denoting the index of the agent for whom the expected
utility is calculated, and a superscript describing the relevant model. For example, UA
denotes the expected utility of agent A in the alternating model, when it sends a query to
agent B .
Parameters of the model are described in lowercase letters, English (most of the
parameters) or Greek (δ, and ω), sometimes with a subscript describing the agent the
parameter is associated with. Finally, macro notations, which are used only for readability
purposes, are denoted by calligraphic letters, sometimes with subscripts.
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3.2. The one-period interaction
Consider the following interaction of two agents, i and j : Agent j is ready to ask a
query, and it can either send it to agent i or not. If it sends the query, then agent i can either
attempt to answer the query or not. If agent i attempts to answer the query, then with a
probability of pi it will succeed in answering the query, but with a probability of 1 − pi
it will fail, where 0 pi  1. (This probability can be calculated as the proportion of past
successful queries to the agent w.r.t. all the past queries to it.) If agent j does not receive
an answer, it does not know whether agent i attempted to answer it and failed, or whether
it even tried.
Agent i incurs an obligatory cost oi for searching for an answer when attempting to
answer a query. If it succeeds in finding an answer then it incurs an additional cost of ci ,
which contains the expenses of retrieving the answer (i.e., its total cost is oi + ci ). If agent
i does not attempt to answer the query at all, then it will have a utility of 0. The asking
agent (agent j ) obtains a utility of vj only if it receives an answer to the query. In any other
case, its utility will be 0. The stage game is described in Fig. 1. As mentioned above, a list
with the notations used here as well as other notations used in the rest of this paper appear
in Appendix A.
Consider the one-period interaction in which agent B is ready to send agent A a query.
There are two pure equilibria for this interaction: in the first, agent B will send the query to
agent A, but agent A will not attempt to answer it. Note that agent B still sends its query,
since we assume that it incurs no cost for sending queries. In the second, agent B will
not send the query at all. In both equilibria, the utility of both agents is 0. In this paper
we present strategy profiles to be used by agents participating in the repeated version of
the above interaction. We prove that under certain conditions, responding to queries is in
equilibrium, and improves the agents’ expected utility.
This problem can be stated more generally. Agent j can ask agent i to perform any
arbitrary action, rather than answer a query. The action is costly to agent i , and it may
succeed or fail. However, if the required results of the action are not achieved, agent j
cannot observe whether this happened because of a failure of the action taken by agent i ,
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or since agent i did not even attempt to perform the action. This problem is different from
the classical repeated principal-agent problem [13] since each agent takes the role of a
principal in part of the interactions, and a role of an agent in the other interactions. In the
rest of the paper we refer to query answering, although our results are also appropriate for
the general problem. In most of the paper, we consider the stage game in which agent B
has a query and agent A has to decide whether to answer it or not. Of course, symmetric
definitions and conclusions are appropriate for the symmetric case, where agent A has a
query for agent B .
3.3. The repeated interaction
In the repeated interaction there are several occurrences over time of the single
interaction described above. We consider an alternating queries model in which agent A
asks a query, then agent B , and vice versa. We assume that if agent A is ready to ask a
query when it is agent B’s turn, it will ask the query somewhere else, and not wait until its
next turn. In [3] we relax this assumption and assume that each agent may have a query to
be asked at each time period.
Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1,2, . . . . If it is agent i’s turn to ask a query, then
the probability for it to have a query at a given time period is qi , and this probability is
known to both agents. Although the agents know the probability distribution of the queries
appearance, they do not know the actual time when queries will appear. This means that at
a given time each agent does not know when exactly it will be ready to send its next query,
or the time its opponent will send its next query. If a query is ready, then the one-period
interaction occurs and we assume that it takes one time period. We consider a discounted
utility function, and denote the discount factor of the utility function δ, where 0  δ < 1.
We assume that interactions continue indefinitely. Our model also suits situations where in
each interaction, there is a positive probability 1− p that no more interactions will occur,
as described in [11]. In this case, if the probability for a next interaction to occur is p, then
δ = p.
The configuration vector ω includes all the relevant parameters. The contents of the
configuration vector are as follows:
ω = (pA,pB, qA, qB, δ, vA, vB, cA, cB, oA, oB),
where pA is the probability for agent A to succeed in answering a query if it attempts to,
pB is the probability for agent B to succeed, qA and qB are the probability for agent A and
agent B , respectively, to have a query in a particular time period, δ is the discount factor,
vA and vB are the utilities of agent A and agent B from receiving an answer to a query, oA
and oB are the cost for agent A and B when attempting to answer a query, and cA and cB
are the additional costs whenever they succeed in answering the query. The set Ω denotes
the set of all possible configuration vectors.
In this paper, we suggest a trigger strategy equilibrium [8] to be used by the agents
in the repeated interaction. Trigger strategies are appropriate for cases where the action
performed by one agent is unobserved by the other one, and it yields an outcome that
is observed by both agents. However, the same outcome may be the result of different
actions, with different probabilities. In this type of equilibrium, an agent uses the outcome
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of its opponent’s action in order to decide whether to behave cooperatively, or to punish
its opponent, and apply the non-cooperative strategy. Trigger strategies surveyed in
the literature are for simultaneous games, and in most of the cases for the prisoner’s
dilemma. We apply this type of strategies to the queries answering problem, which is a
nonsimultaneous game.
4. A one-period observation model
In this section, we consider a strategy profile where punishment is performed after each
time an answer is not obtained from the opponent, though in some cases the outcome is
not deliberately caused by the opponent. Using a trigger strategy profile causes the agents
to attempt to answer each other’s queries, thus increasing the agents expected utility with
regards to the case where the equilibrium of the one-period interaction is implemented.
However, there are cases where agents are punished due to failure in answering queries.
We begin this section by defining the trigger strategy profile.
4.1. Strategy profile
We suggest that the agents use a trigger strategy profile which is based on three possible
“phases”: Normal, PunishA and PunishB . In phase Normal, each agent attempts to answer
the query of the other agent. In phase Punishi , agent j = i ignores the queries of agent i , but
if agent j asks a query, agent i will attempt to answer it. At the beginning, the agents are in
phase Normal, and remain there provided each agent answers its opponent’s query. Given
phase Normal, when an agent i does not answer a query, the agents switch to Punishi .
This punishment phase holds until agent i answers a query of agent j , in which case, the
agents return to phase Normal. This strategy profile promotes cooperation and information
sharing.
4.2. Expected discount over time
In this section, we discuss the discount factor of the expected utility over time. This
discussion will be valid for the one-period observation model, and also for the n-period
observation and the k-model of punishment after k unanswered queries from n. Di is the
expected discount ratio from the time agent j asks a query, until the time agent i will be
ready to ask a query. With a probability of qi the delay will be for one time period, in which
case, a discount of δ should be considered. With a probability of qi(1− qi) there will be
a delay of two time periods (a discount of δ2), and with a probability of (1− qi)kqi there
will be a delay of k + 1 periods, and the discount ratio will be δk+1. Di is the sum of the
above infinite geometric series. Thus, the value of Di is
Di = δqi + δ2(1− qi)qi + · · · = δqi1− δ(1− qi) . (1)
We proceed by evaluating the discount ratio in a case of punishment. Consider a case in
which agent A has to be punished. This means that the last query was sent from agent B ,
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and no response was obtained from agent A. Since the agents alternate their queries, the
next query will be sent by agentA, but it will be ignored by agent B . The consequent query
will be sent by agent B , and agent A will attempt to answer it, as defined in Section 4.1.
Denote the present time when agent A does not send an answer t0, the time when agent
A has a query tA, and the time after tA in which agent B sends a query to agent A, tB .
Denote the overall expected discount ratio from t0 until tB , D. The minimal value of D is
in the case where tB = tA+ 1. Namely, immediately after the period in which agent A asks
a query which is ignored, agent B asks a query back. This event occurs with a probability
of qB , and in this case, the total discount factor will be D = DAδ. With a probability of
qB(1− qB), the delay will be for two time periods. In this case, D=DAδ2. In the general
case, with a probability of qB(1 − qB)i , the delay will be for i + 1 time periods, and the
discount factor will be D =DAδi+1.
Again, we obtain a geometric series of the expected discount ratio:
D =DAδqB +DAδ2(1− qB)qB +DAδ3(1− qB)2qB + · · ·
=DA δqB1− δ(1− qB)
and according to Eq. (1), this is equal to
D = δ
2qAqB
(1− δ(1− qA))(1− δ(1− qB)) =DADB. (2)
Symmetrically,D is also the expected discount in the case of punishing agent B . In the
following lemma, we prove that 0Di < 1, and also that 0D < 1.
Lemma 4.1. Given 0  δ < 1, for each i ∈ {A,B}, if 0 qi  1, then 0 Di < 1, and if
0 qA,qB  1, then 0D< 1.
The proof of this lemma, as well as the proofs of the lemmas and theorems in the rest
of this paper, appear in Appendix A. The terms D, DA and DB will be used in the rest of
this paper, to calculate the expected utility from the next interaction. The expected utility
of a value v obtained in the next interaction will be v multiplied by the appropriate D or
Di , since 0D 1, D and Di can be considered standard discount factors.
4.3. Expected utility
In this section, we specify the expected utility of the agents when they follow the
strategies profile described above, and the conditions under which this profile is in
equilibrium. The expected utility of each agent is based on the fact that the agents follow
the equilibrium strategies. In the following, we define the terms that will be used for these
specifications.
Definition 4.1. The following terms express the expected utility of the agents, from the
present until infinity.
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• Vi : the expected utility of agent i if it attempts to answer the query of agent j (whether
it succeeds or not).
• Ui : the expected utility of agent i when it is agent j ’s turn to answer i’s query (whether
j succeeds or not).
• Fi : the expected utility of agent i as the agents move to phase Punishi (either since
agent i ignored the last query, or because of agent i’s failure to answer it).
Generally, we consider the expected utility and the trigger equilibrium condition of
agent A. B’s specifications can be detailed symmetrically. We consider an unrestricted
horizon model, so the utility terms are defined recursively.
Attribute 4.1. The values of VA, UA, and FA are computed as follows.
VA =−oA+ pA(−cA+DAUA)+ (1− pA)FA, (3)
UA = pB(vA +DBVA)+ (1− pB)DUA, (4)
FA =DVA. (5)
VA is the expected utility of agent A from attempting to answer a query. It consists of
the obligatory cost oA, and the expected future utility when the attempt to answer succeeds,
and the expected utility when it fails, with the corresponding probabilities for both events.
In case of success, the utility of agent A consists of the cost of cA, and of its utility from
asking agent B a query (UA), after an expected discount of DA. In case of failure, agent
A’s utility is FA.
UA is the expected utility of agent A when it asks a query. If agent B succeeds to answer
agent A’s query, then agent A receives an immediate utility of vA, and the agent stays in
state Normal, i.e., after a delay of DB , agent A will be required to answer agent B’s query,
with an expected utility of VA. If agent B fails to answer the query, then after a delay of D,
it will be required to answer the next query of agent A, i.e., agent A’s expected utility is
UA.
FA is the utility of agent A when it does not answer the query of agent B . Agent A will
be punished, and after an expected discount ratio of D, again, it will be its turn to answer
agent B’s query, i.e., its expected utility will be VA.
4.4. Equilibrium conditions
We proceed by identifying the conditions under which the trigger equilibrium exists.
In particular, we use the strategy profile defined in the beginning of Section 4.1, and we
specify the condition under which an agent prefers the trigger strategy over deviation and
ignoring its opponent’s queries, given that the second agent uses the trigger strategy. If the
condition of each agent holds, then the trigger strategy profile is in equilibrium.
In order to prove that the strategy profile is in equilibrium, we have to prove that
whenever agent i follows its equilibrium strategy, it is worthwhile for agent j to keep
its equilibrium strategy too. In the following lemma, we prove under which condition this
holds.
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Lemma 4.2. The trigger equilibrium of the one-period observation strategy profile is in
equilibrium if Vi  Fi , for i ∈ {A,B}.
The above condition claims that whenever the utility of answering a query is higher
for the agent than its utility from ignoring the query, a trigger equilibrium exists.
In the following lemma, we found an explicit formula which defines VA, by using
formulas (3)–(5).
Lemma 4.3. The expected utility of agent A when attempting to answer a query, can be
formalized as follows.
VA = −oA − pAcA + pADAA1− pADAB− (1− pA)D , (6)
where
A= pB ∗ vA
1+D(pB − 1) (7)
and
B = DB ∗ pB
1+D(pB − 1) . (8)
After manipulating, the expected utility can be formalized also as follows:
VA = (1+DpB −D)(−oA − pAcA)+ pADApBvA
(1+DpB −D)(1−D+DpA)− pADpB . (9)
Using Lemma 4.2, and the definitions of FA and FB , we can progress by finding the
explicit conditions for the existence of the trigger equilibrium. The condition of agent i
can be displayed as a required ratio between vi and ci + oi/p(i) for agent i ∈ {A,B}. We
start with two propositions. First, we prove that the denominator of VA is positive.
Proposition 4.1. The term 1−pADAB−D(1−pA) is positive whenever 0DA,pA  1.
We proceed by proving the conditions required for the equilibrium to hold.
Lemma 4.4. If the agents are risk-neutral, then the one-period observation strategy is in
equilibrium for agents A and B , if the following condition holds for both i =A, j = B and
i = B , j =A.
vi
ci + oi/pi 
(
1− δ+ δqi
δqipj
+ δqj (pj − 1)
pj (1− δ+ δqj )
)
. (10)
Using the above lemmas, important properties can be identified concerning the strength
of the equilibrium and the influence of the configuration parameters on the conditions of the
equilibrium and on the agents expected utility. We present our conclusions in the following
section.
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4.5. Properties of the expected utility and of the equilibrium conditionsIn this section, we study the existence of the trigger equilibrium and the agents’ expected
utility VA. According to Lemma 4.2, the value VA − FA should be non-negative for the
equilibrium to exist. As this value increases, the trigger equilibrium exists for a larger
set of configurations. Some of our conclusions are proved formally, while others are
demonstrated for a particular configuration of parameters ω = (qi = 0.1,pi = 0.5, δ =
0.9, ci = 1, oi = 0.1, vi = 10). In the following lemma, we prove the influence direction
of pi and of the cost and benefit parameters of the utilities and of the equilibrium
conditions.
Lemma 4.5. As vA, pA or pB increases, and as oA or cA decreases, the expected utility of
each agent increases, and the trigger equilibrium holds for more configurations.
The above conclusion is intuitive. That is, as vA, the benefits an agent obtains from
answering queries, increases, the utility of agent A increases, and it is more worthwhile for
it to answer queries. It is also expected that the directions of the influence of oA and cA will
be opposite: as they increase, attempting to answer queries is more costly, so the utility, as
well as the tendency of agent A to answer queries, decreases. Similarly, as pA increases,
VA increases, since if agent A succeeds in answering more queries, its utility increases.
As pB increases, agent B succeeds in answering more queries of agent A, and agent A’s
utility increases (more cases where a utility of vA is obtained), as well as its willingness to
answer B’s queries.
In the following lemma, we prove the influence direction of δ, qA and qB , both on the
expected utility of the agent and on its tendency to use the trigger strategy.
Lemma 4.6. As δ, qA or qB increases, the expected utility of each agent increases, and the
trigger equilibrium exists for more configurations.
As δ increases, the expected utility of agent A also increases, as well as its tendency to
attempt to answer agent B’s query, because agent A bears present costs in order to achieve
future benefits. Thus, as the discount of time decreases, the weight of the future benefits
increases, and this causes the utility to increase, and the tendency to answer queries to
increase too.
As qA increases, agent A is supposed to ask queries more frequently, consequently its
utility from receiving answers increases. Thus, it is more beneficial for it to answer other
agents’ queries, since this will enable it to receive answers to its own queries. Thus, its
tendency to attempt to answer queries, and its expected utility in this situation, increase
with qA. The influence of qB is not intuitively clear. On the one hand, as qB increases,
agent B will ask a query more often, and this causes future costs for agent A. On the other
hand, since the agents alternate in asking their queries, more frequent queries of agent B
will cause agent A to also ask queries more often, and this may improve its utility, and
its motivation to answer agent B’s queries. However, as we proved in Lemma 4.6, the
alternating effect is stronger, and as qB increases, the expected utility increases and the
equilibrium exists more frequently.
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In [3] we also considered the influence of qB in situations where queries are not
alternating, but at any given time, each agent can send a query. In these situations the
influence of qB is negative: as agent B is supposed to have more queries, the expected
utility of agent A decreases.
To summarize, we have shown the influence of several parameters on the expected utility
of agent A, and on its willingness to attempt to answer queries. Symmetric conclusions
hold for agent B’s utility and its trigger equilibrium condition. We can see that as the
factors change in a direction that increases the utility of the agent, it will be more motivated
to attempt to answer its opponent’s queries. This conclusion does not hold for the situation
that is presented in Section 5, with the change in the length of the history that is taken into
consideration.
5. A model with n observation periods
The equilibrium structures described in the previous section enable the agents to share
information with each other, due to the fact that an agent that did not respond to a query,
will be punished by the sender of the query. However, an agent is not punished only when
it ignores a query. Any event of a query with no response yields a punishment, regardless if
this was caused by its ignoring the query, or because of a failure to answer the query after
a costly attempt.
One can suggest a refined strategy profile, where punishment is done only after a given
number of queries with no response. The benefits of such a protocol are based on the fact
that punishment will be done more rarely. Such a protocol is more fair, since it reduces
the probability of punishing an agent that attempts to answer all the queries it receives.
Increasing the number of failures required for punishment also increases the average utility
of the agents. However, since the threat to punish is weakened, the equilibrium based on
this approach is weaker than the equilibrium based on punishment after each missing
response. This means that as the number of periods required in order to decide about a
punishment increases, there are more situations where an agent can beneficially ignore
queries.
We consider three variations of the n-period observation model. First, for demonstra-
tion, in Section 5.1 we present a model where n = 2, and we compare this model to the
one-period model (n= 1) discussed in Section 4. Second, in Section 5.2, an agent is pun-
ished after n consequent queries with no answer by this agent. Finally, in Section 5.3,
punishment is implemented after k unanswered queries, from the n last queries to that
agent.
In this paper, we consider only pure trigger strategies for these cases, whereas in [3]
we considered a mixed strategy profile. In the mixed strategy an agent i randomly decides
whether or not to attempt to answer a query for some histories. There are two situations in
which mixed actions can be used: (a) in a punishment phase, where agent i is allowed to
punish agent j ; (b) in the normal phase, where agent i is supposed to answer j ’s query. We
proved that a mixed strategy profile in a punishment phase (case (a)) is not stable. A mixed
strategy profile may be stable in the Normal phase (case (b)), but we proved that the
conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are equivalent to those of the corresponding
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pure strategy, while the expected utility of the agents when using a mixed strategy profile
is lower than their expected utility when using the corresponding pure strategies. Thus,
mixed strategies are not recommended for use in our model and throughout the rest of this
paper we refer only to the pure strategies.
In order to consider the last n periods when deciding on a punishment, the agent should
save the history of the last n − 1 results (answered or ignored) of queries sent to its
opponent, and add the result of the present queries. We denote by hi the results of the
n − 1 last events when agent i was required to answer queries. The history of agent i
is composed as follows: hi = (hi(n − 1), . . . , hi(2), hi(1)), where hi(1) represents the
last event of a query sent to agent i . hi(k) = 0 if k’s last query to agent i received no
answer, and hi(k) = 1 if k’s last query was answered by agent i . The term h = (hA,hB)
contains the n − 1 last events with respect to the queries that agent A received, and the
n− 1 last events with respect to queries that agent B received. In particular, the notation
((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)), indicates a history of n−1 consequent successful answers of agent
A, and n− 1 consequent queries to agent B , with no response. Concatenating a new event
to hi , hi  new_event, means deleting the oldest event in hi , and adding a new event
to hi . Finally, the function zero(hi) returns true if all the events in hi are unanswered
queries. Formally, zero(hi) = true if ∑n−1k=1 hi(k) = 0. Using these notations, we proceed
with describing and analyzing the two variations of the n-period model.
5.1. Punishment after two unanswered queries
In this section, we consider a special case of punishment after two consequent periods
of no response from an agent. If a two-period strategy profile is in use, the agent will be
concerned with both its own history, and the history of its opponent, when deciding whether
to answer a query or not. If no punishment mode is reached, then it will only be concerned
with the last event in the history of both. If its last event was an unanswered query, then
if it will also not answer in the current period (either because of a failure or because of
ignoring the query), an immediate punishment will be implemented. In contrast, if the last
event in its history contains a successful response, then an unanswered query at this time
may be forgiven, and in some cases, it may be beneficial for the agent to ignore queries in
this state.
We denote a successful event 1 and an unanswered query event 0. Since we are
interested in the last event of each of the servers, we denote the current state (a, b).
a ∈ {0,1} is the last event of agent i (1 if agent A succeeds in answering, 0 if it did not
send an answer). Similarly, b ∈ {0,1} is the last event of agent B .
5.1.1. Structure of the utility function
In order to analyze the two-period model, we will use the same notation as used in
Section 4. However, we use additional terms with respect to the expected utility of the
agents, since there are four different possible states, as described below, and for each of
them, the expected utility will be slightly different.
Denote by V xyA the expected utility of agent A, when the last event performed by agent
A is x , and the last event performed by agent B is y , and it is now agent A’s turn to
answer a query. However, none of the agents are in a punishment phase. Since the agents
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are assumed to hold the strategies defined above, agent A will attempt to answer the query.
Denote by UxyA the expected utility of agent A, when the last event performed by agent A
is x , the last event performed by agent B is y , and it is now agent B’s turn to answer agent
A’s query. Again, both agents are not in a punishment phase. Thus, agent B will attempt
to answer agent A’s query.
In the following formulas we specify the expected utility for each of the 4 cases. V 11A
is the utility of agent A when a query was sent to it, and the last event of both agents
was a success. With a probability of pA, agent A will succeed in answering, and with a
probability of 1 − pA, it will fail. In both cases it incurs a cost of oA, and in the case of
success, it incurs a cost of cA. The actual event, success or failure, determines agent A’s
history when continuing to the next time period, where agent A sends a query.
V 11A =−oA + pA
(−cA +DAU11A )+ (1− pA)DAU01A . (11)
V 10A is the expected utility of agent A when it has to answer a query, and its last event
was a success in answering agent B’s query, but it did not receive an answer to its last
query from agent B . The explanation is similar to that of V 11A .
V 10A =−oA + pA
(−cA +DAU10A )+ (1− pA)DAU00A . (12)
In states (0,0) and (0,1), the last query sent to agent A is not answered. Thus, if for
the current query it will also not receive an answer, a punishment is implemented. The
punishment is skipping its turn to obtain an answer to a query, as in the one stage alternating
model.
V 00A =−oA + pA
(−cA +DAU10A )+ (1− pA)DADBV 00A (13)
and finally,
V 01A =−oA + pA
(−cA +DAU11A )+ (1− pA)DADBV 01A . (14)
The following formulas specify the utility of agent A when it is agent B’s turn to answer
its queries. Again, the utility depends on the history of the last events of both agents.
U00A = pB
(
vA +DBV 01A
)+ (1− pB)DADBU00A , (15)
U10A = pB
(
vA +DBV 11A
)+ (1− pB)DADBU10A , (16)
U01A = pB
(
vA +DBV 01A
)+ (1− pB)DBV 00A , (17)
U11A = pB
(
vA +DBV 11A
)+ (1− pB)DBV 10A . (18)
The above recursive equations can be solved in order to find a solution which gives the
complete description of the utility in each state. We solved the equations using Maple, and
found the explicit expected utility, and the conditions for an equilibrium to exist. However,
since the results contain a very complex structure of the solution we refrain from presenting
them here.1 In the next section we demonstrate the behavior of the expected utility and the
conditions for the equilibrium, and compare them with that of the one-period model.
1 A full version including the explicit expected utility is available in http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~schwart/
articles/rep-full.ps.
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5.1.2. Properties of the model
Intuitively, for most of the possible configurations, if punishment is done after two
periods of observation instead of after one period, then the expected utility of an agent is
higher, assuming that both agents follow the trigger strategies. This is because punishment
is caused only in situations that an agent fails to answer queries in two consecutive periods
(under the assumption that it always attempts to answer). The probability for such an event
is much lower than the probability for one failure, which causes punishment to the agent in
the one-period model. It is also intuitive that in the current model the motivation to follow
the trigger strategy is much lower, since deviation from equilibrium does not always yield
immediate punishment.
In order to compare the equilibrium conditions in the two-period model with that of
the one-period model, we can focus on state (1,0), where, assuming that in the past both
agents used the trigger strategies, agent A succeeds in answering the last query of agent B ,
while agent B fails to answer the last query of agent A. We check whether it is worthwhile
for agent A to answer agent B in this turn. In particular, we verify whether
V 10A −DAU00A  0
i.e., whether the utility of attempting to answer a query in state (1,0) is higher than the
utility of ignoring the query.2 We denote the equilibrium existence index V 10A − DAU00A .
Whenever the index value is positive, an equilibrium exists for this set of parameters. As
the value of the index increases, an equilibrium exists for more sets of parameters. We also
define the equilibrium existence index of the one-period observation model as VA−D∗VA.
Whenever this index is positive, an equilibrium exists. As the index value increases, the
equilibrium becomes stronger, and holds for more values of the other parameters.
In order to evaluate the expected utility, we use VA for the one-period observation
model, and we use V 11A for the two-period model, since we consider a situation with no
failure or deviating in the past. In the following paragraphs we demonstrate the influence
of several parameters on the expected utility and on the equilibrium conditions for a
particular configuration of parameters. The basic configuration is ω = (qi = 0.5,pi =
0.5, δ= 0.9, ci = 0.1, oi = 0.1, vi = 10).
Influence of vA, cA and oA. First, we consider the influence of cA and vA on the expected
utility. As explained above, we assess the influence on V 11A . As expected, the increase of
vA and the decrease of cA cause an increase of V 11A . We illustrate this influence in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 3, we present the values of both V 11A and VA of the one-period model, for
different values of vA, assuming cA = 1. We revealed that V 11A is higher than VA, and
the difference increases as vA increases. We can see that for vA near zero, the curves are
crossed. For the above set of parameters, the expected utility in both models is equal for
both models when cA = 3.296299245∗ vA. However, if such a relation exists between cA
and vA, then equilibria of both types will not exist. If the cost of answering a query is
more than the benefit of a possible answer in the future, then an agent has no motivation to
answer queries.
2 Proof of why it is sufficient to consider state (1,0) in order to prove the existence of an equilibrium is
provided for the n-period case in Lemma 5.1.
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Fig. 3. Two-period observation model: V 11A and VA as functions of vA (given cA = 1).
Next, we checked the influence of cA and vA on the equilibrium existence index for
the two-period model. The results are presented in Fig. 4. It is clear that, as in the one-
period model, as cA and oA increase, and as vA decreases, the equilibrium exists for a
larger set of configurations. In Fig. 5 we compare the equilibrium existence index of the
two-period model with that of the one-period model, for different values of vA, and for
cA = 1. We can see that for these values, equilibrium of the two-period model does not
exist, while equilibrium of the one-period model exists from a given value of vA. For the
above sets of parameters, we checked for which values of vA and cA equilibrium exists,
and we found that the equilibrium of one-period model exists for vA  4.498245616∗ cA,
while the equilibrium of the two-period model exists only for vA  80.15503155∗ cA.
Influence of δ. In order to demonstrate the influence of δ on the expected utility of the
agents and on the strength of the equilibrium, we set cA as 0.1. This enabled equilibrium
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Fig. 5. Two-period observation model: the influence of vA on the equilibrium existence index VA − DVA
(one-period model) and on V 10A −DAU00A (two-period model).
to exist for different values of δ also for the two-period model, though for cA = 1, as
previously determined, equilibrium does not hold.
Thus, the set of parameters we used in the following figures is qA = qB = 0.1, pA =
pB = 0.5, c= 0.1, o= 0.1 and v = 10.
The influence direction of δ on the expected utility and on the equilibrium existence
index of the two-period model is, as expected, similar to the influence of the direction in
the one-period model: As δ increases, the expected utility of the agent also increases, as
well as the set of configurations for which the equilibrium conditions hold. (The interesting
phenomena, as demonstrated below, is the clear influence of δ on the difference between
the utilities of both models, and on the difference between the equilibrium existence indices
of both models.) Fig. 6 shows V 11A , V 01A , and VA, as functions of δ.
The expected utility for δ = 0 is the same for the three functions. This can be explained,
since the expected utility for δ = 0, where the agents do not regard the future expected
utility, contains only the current costs of cA and oA. As δ increases, the future becomes
more important, so the difference between the curves also increases.
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Fig. 7. Two-period observation model: the influence of δ on the equilibrium existence index in state (1,0).
Our next set of figures demonstrates the influence of δ on the value of the equilibrium
existence index. Fig. 7 demonstrates that as δ increases, the equilibrium becomes stronger.
This is intuitively clear, since as δ increases, the future is more important, so an equilibrium
exists more frequently. For small values of δ, the value of the equilibrium existence index
is negative, i.e., the trigger equilibrium does not exist for the considered parameters profile.
The equilibrium existence index in the one-period model and the index in the two-period
model are shown in Fig. 7. They give the same (negative) value for δ = 0, but as δ increases,
the condition tends to hold more for the one-period model, and the difference between the
equilibrium existence indices increases as δ increases. The reason being that in the one-
period model, punishment is performed more often in the future, so as δ increases, and the
future becomes more important, the punishment becomes more threatening.
Influence of qA and qB . Fig. 8 demonstrates the influence of qA and qB on the expected
utility, and Fig. 9 shows their influence on the tendency to answer queries. We found that
increasing the tendency to ask queries (qA) or to receive queries (qB ) increases the util-
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Fig. 9. Two-period observation model: the influence of qA and qB on the equilibrium existence index in state
(1,0).
ity of the agents and its tendency to answer queries. These results are intuitively clear, as
explained in the one-period model.
We also found that as qA or qB increases, the difference between the expected utility in
the two-period model and the expected utility in the one-period model increases. In other
words, as the frequency of queries increases, the expected utility in the two-period model
is influenced more than the expected utility in the one-period model. The intuition for
this result is similar to the intuition for the influence of δ on the difference between these
two models. As qA or qB increases, the future obtains a higher weight since it depends
on the difference in punishments in future interactions. Thus, the difference between the
one-period model and the two-period model increases.
Influence of pA and pB . The influence of pA and pB on the expected utility is
demonstrated in Fig. 10. The influence is clearly positive, for the same reasons as explained
in the one-period model. Fig. 11 shows the influence of pA and pB on the conditions. It is
clear from the figure that as pB increases, agent A will tend to attempt to answer queries,
since the probability of its own queries to be answered increases.
However, the influence of pA on the equilibrium existence index depends on the entire
environment configuration, and this is also demonstrated in Fig. 12. In this figure, the
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Fig. 11. Two-period observation model: the influence of pA and pB on the equilibrium existence index in state
(1,0).
equilibrium existence index is shown as a function of pA for both the two-period model (the
descending line) and the one-period model (the ascending line), while pB is fixed at 0.5.
We can see that while in the one-period model, as pA increases, an equilibrium exists
more often, the influence of pA on the equilibrium in the two-period model depends on
the environment. For pB = 0.5, an increase of pA causes the equilibrium existence index
to increase until pA = 0.472, but from this maximum point, the influence of pA becomes
negative. The explanation for this phenomenon is that for higher values of pA, the threat
of punishment due to ignoring one query decreases, given state (1,0). The reason for this
reduction is that punishment of agent A will be performed only if the next query to agent A
will not be answered, and this probability decreases as pA increases. Thus, for high values
of pA, as pA increases, there may be more environments in which agent A can allow itself
to ignore queries, given that no immediate punishment will be performed.
When comparing V 11A with VA in the examples we checked, as predicted, we found
that the expected utility when using the two-period observation model is higher than
the expected utility in the one-period alternating model. This remains true even when
comparing V 01A and VA.
66 R. Azoulay-Schwartz, S. Kraus / Artificial Intelligence 154 (2004) 43–93Fig. 12. The influence of pA on the equilibrium existence index in the two-period model, where pB = 0.5.
Nevertheless, in our testing we found that V 01A  VA for different values of parameters.
In other words, if we compare the expected utility of an agent after one failure in the two-
period model, the expected utility is still higher than in the one-period model, for the values
of parameters where equilibrium exists.
However, in both cases failure of agent A to answer the current query will yield an
immediate punishment. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the utility
function of the agent is recursive and it also includes future events: even if in the next
period, success of agent A will cause agent B to attempt to answer it, and failure to
answer will cause agent B to ignore its query, the utility function also includes future
events, in which the two-period model yields a higher expected utility than the one-period
observation model.
5.1.3. Summary
Nevertheless, the two-period strategy profile, although yielding a higher expected
utility, has a significant disadvantage. There are much more situations where it is not in
equilibrium. In fact, the basic profile we used for demonstration in the previous sections
of this paper, δ = 0.9, qA = qB = 0.1, pA = pB = 0.5, vA = 10, cA = 1, oA = 0.1, was
appropriate for the one-period profile, but the two-period profile was not in equilibrium for
these parameters.
The main conclusion of the above observation is that the agents’ designers, when
designing information sharing agents, should consider the environment parameters and
decide which model to use according to the configuration parameters. This conclusion can
be generalized for the n-period model presented below.
5.2. Equilibrium with punishment after n unanswered queries
In this section, we analyze a model in which punishment of an agent is performed after
n consecutive events of queries with no responses, assuming an alternating queries model.
The strategies and phases of the n-period model are defined as in Section 4.1, but moving
from phase Normal to phase Punishi will occur only after n consecutive queries with no
response from agent i . A strategy is an n-period trigger strategy if it tells each agent i to
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answer queries of its opponent j , unless the last n queries sent to j received no answer. In
this case, agent i ignores the queries of agent j , until it receives an answer to a query from
agent j . Denote by Ωn ⊆Ω the set of all ω ∈Ω , such that the pair of n-period strategies
is in equilibrium given configuration ω.
5.2.1. Expected utility
Assuming that both agents use their n-period strategies, V n,hA is the expected utility
of agent A when it obtains a query from agent B given history h. Similarly, Un,hA is the
expected utility of agent A when it waits for an answer from agent B . Suppose that the
agents are in the Normal phase:
sucA(h)=
(−oA − cA +DAUn,(hA1,hB)A )
is the expected utility of agent A from successfully answering a query of agent B . This
includes the cost cA, and the expected utility of asking a query after a delay of DA. Denote
by
failA(h)=−oADAUn,(hA0,hB)A
the expected utility of agent A from a failure to answer agent B’s query, if this didn’t cause
an immediate punishment. It includes an expected utility of asking a query after a delay
of DA, but the failure is noted in hA, and may cause a future punishment, if there will be
future consecutive failures. Finally,
punA(h)=−oA +DV n,(hA0,hB)A
is the expected utility of agent A from a punishment. After a delay of D, agent A will
be expected to answer agent B’s query. The expected utility of agent A when required to
answer a query, denoted V n,hA , is defined as follows:
V
n,h
A =
{
pA · sucA(h)+ (1− pA)punA(h) zero(hA)= true,
pA · sucA(h)+ (1− pA)failA(h) otherwise. (19)
Since agent A attempts to answer the query, it bears a cost of oA. With a probability of
pA it will succeed in answering the query, and then its expected utility is sucA(h). With a
probability of 1−pA it will fail, which will be noted in its history. If the current history of
agent A includes only zeroes, then PunishA is reached and the expected utility of agent A
is punA(h). Otherwise, its expected utility is failA(h).
Similarly,
sucB(h)= vA +DBV n,(hA,hB1)A
is the expected utility of agent A when agent B succeeds in answering its query,
failB(h)=DBV n,(hA,hB0)A
is A’s utility when agent B fails to answer A’s query, but punishment of B is not required,
and punB(h) = DUn,(hA,hB0)A is A’s utility when punishing agent B is required. Using
the above, the expected utility of agent A, when it forwards a query to agent B , given n
and h, denoted Un,hA , is defined as follows:
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U
n,h =
{
pB · sucB(h)+ (1− pB)punB(h) zero(hB)= true, (20)A pB · sucB(h)+ (1− pB)failB(h) otherwise.
With a probability of pB , agent B will succeed in answering, and agent A’s expected
utility will be sucB(h). With a probability of 1 − pB , agent B will fail to answer agent
A’s query. In this case, if punishment is required, then the expected utility of agent A is
punB(h). Otherwise, its expected utility is failB(h).
For the expected utility calculation, the agent has to use an algorithm based on the
formulas of V n,hA and U
n,h
A . These formulas depend on each other. In order to implement
the calculation, a predefined depth (number of future periods) should be taken into
consideration. A divide and conquer algorithm, or a dynamic programming algorithm, can
be used in order to calculate the values of the formulas. The dynamic programming method
is based on filling the value of V n,hA and U
n,h
A for each possible history. In the n-period
model, all histories with a last success are equivalent (since punishment will be performed
after n unanswered queries), and all the histories with last k failures are equivalent (since
punishment will be performed after an additional n − k unanswered queries). Thus, the
state, for which the utilities and the equilibrium conditions are defined, is the number of
last consecutive failures. Thus, only n + 1 different states have to be observed, for each
possible number of last subsequent failures, from 0 to n. Since there are two agents, there
are (n+ 1)2 different states to be considered. The utility of both agents will be evaluated
for each state.
5.2.2. Properties of the n-period model
In the following paragraphs, we analyze important properties of the n-period history
model. In particular, we test the influence of n on the expected utility of the agents and on
the conditions required for the existence of an n-period strategy equilibrium.
In this section we use the following notations. Denote by exp_ui(ω,n,history) the
expected utility of agent i from a model in which punishment is imposed after n
periods, given history of n last periods for each agent. Given configuration ω, history =
(histA,histB), and the n-period observation model, the agent can evaluate the difference
between its utility after answering a query, and its utility after ignoring a query. Formally,
denote by ignr_lossi (ω,n,history) the loss of agent i when it does not answer a query,
w.r.t. the case when it does answer. The definition of ignr_lossA(ω,n,history) for the
model of punishment after n consecutive failures, is as follows:
ignr_lossA
(
ω,n, (histA,histB)
)
=


DA(vA + exp_uA(ω,n, (histA 1,histB))
−exp_uA(ω,n, (histA 0,histB))) zero(histA) = true,
DA(exp_uA(ω,n, (histA 1,histB))
−exp_uA(ω,n, (histA 0,histB))) otherwise.
(21)
This means that the loss of agent A from avoiding answering a query is an immediate
punishment, if it is required, but it also contains the future losses due to the effect of this
unanswered query in the future. In order to prove our claims about the n-period strategy
profile we start with an auxiliary lemma that will help us reveal when the equilibrium
conditions hold.
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Lemma 5.1. Consider a trigger equilibrium based on the n-period strategy profile. The
equilibrium will exist, if it is worthwhile for agent A to attempt to answer agent B after a
history of ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)), and if it is worthwhile for agent B to attempt to answer
agent A after a history of ((0, . . . ,0), (1, . . . ,1)).
After a history of ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)), a future punishment of agent A due to current
ignorance of a query has the lowest probability after the longest delay. Thus, if it is still
worthwhile for A to hold the equilibrium strategy given this history, it will be worthwhile
for it to do so after any other history. Similarly, if it is worthwhile for agent B to hold the
equilibrium strategy given a history of ((0, . . . ,0), (1, . . . ,1)), then it will be worthwhile
for it to do so after any other history. Based on Lemma 5.1, in order to determine whether
or not an n-period equilibrium exists, we only need to consider the ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))
history of agent A, and the ((0, . . . ,0), (1, . . . ,1)) history of agent B . Based on this
reasoning, in order to check whether an equilibrium exists or not, we only have to check
the ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)) condition. We will use this attribute in order to prove that
ignr_lossA(ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))) increases as n decreases. When we consider an
n+ 1-period model, the history includes 2n events instead of 2(n− 1).
However, in order to compare ignr_lossA of the n-period observation model with
that of the n + 1, we check when an equilibrium exists given a history of ((x,1,
. . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0)) (at least n− 1 successful events of agent A, and exactly n− 1 failure
events of agent B) when considering the n+1-period model. This is because a history with
n consequence failures will cause an immediate punishment of agent B . In the following
lemma, we prove that as n increases, the loss of an agent from ignoring a query decreases.
Lemma 5.2. Given a history of exactly n − 1 consecutive queries to agent B with no
answer, and at least n− 1 consecutive successes of agent A,
ignr_lossA
(
ω,n+ 1, ((x,1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0)))
< ignr_lossA
(
ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))
)
.
In addition,
ignr_lossA
(
ω,n+ 1, ((x,1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0)))
 (1− pA)ignr_lossA
(
ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))
)
.
In the following lemma we prove that there are more configurations in equilibrium in
the n-period observation strategies than in the n+ 1-period observation strategies. In other
words, as we observed when comparing the models of n = 1 and n = 2, as n increases
the equilibrium conditions become more restrictive. This will be proven in the following
lemma.
Theorem 5.1. For each n ∈N , Ωn+1 ⊂Ωn. Moreover, for each ω ∈Ω , n ∈N exists, such
that ω /∈Ωn, but for each 0 < n′ < n, ω ∈Ωn′ .
The motivation in the above lemma is that as n increases, the probability of punishment
because of a present disregard of a query becomes lower, and the time when this
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punishment will be implemented becomes more distant. Thus, there are more combinations
for which the threat on an agent is not strong enough. The above theorem provides a
simple rule for finding the optimal strategy profile for a given configuration. If an n-period
equilibrium does not exist, the agents should reduce n, until they obtain n′ for which n′-
period equilibrium does exist. They should find the largest possible n′, since, as proven
in Theorem 5.2, increasing n increases the expected utility of the agents. In the theorem
below, we prove our main claim about the change in the agents’ utilities: as n, the number
of periods considered to decide about a punishment, increases the agent’s average utility
also increases.
More generally, we can show that for each configuration of parameters we can find the
largest n, such that for any smaller n′ < n, answering will be in equilibrium for any history,
given this configuration. This is important, since it will be possible to determine the largest
n given a configuration, and, as we prove later, this will attain the optimal expected utility
for the agents.
Lemma 5.3. n ∈N exists for each ω ∈Ω such that ω /∈Ωn, but for each n′ < n, ω ∈Ωn′ .
In the above lemma we show that a smaller n enables more configurations to be stable.
However, we will now show that as we observed when comparing the models of n = 1
and n = 2, a larger n increases the expected average utility of the agents. Thus, given a
configuration, it is beneficial to find the largest n for which answering is in equilibrium
for this configuration. We start with an auxiliary lemma, and then we proceed with our
conclusions.
Lemma 5.4. Given n ∈ N , for each ω, such that ω ∈ Ωn, for each history, the expected
utility of agent A from receiving an answer from agent B , is higher than the expected
utility if the query receives no answer.
In the following lemma we prove our main claim about the change in the agents’
utilities: as n, the number of periods considered to decide about a punishment increases,
the agent’s average utility increases too. This was demonstrated in Section 5.1.2 for the
case of changing n from one-period to two periods. In the following theorem, we prove
that the same direction of influence exists for any positive n.
Theorem 5.2. For each agent i , for each n ∈N , for each ω, such that ω ∈Ωn∩Ωn+1, and
for each history h, V n+1,hi > V n,hi .
We demonstrate our main conclusions in Fig. 13, for a particular configuration of
parameters (ci = 1, oi = 0.1, vi = 100, pi = 0.5, Di = 0.9).3 The figure demonstrates
that as n increases V n,hA also increases, as proven in Theorem 5.2, but the increase is not
linear: the increment level decreases as n increases. However, as proven in Lemma 5.1, as
3 The value vi is much larger than its value in the one-period model since we consider models with a more
restricted set of configurations for which the equilibrium exists.
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n grows, the set of appropriate configuration values becomes smaller. This is demonstrated
in the lower dotted curve, which shows the difference between the expected utility of agent
A if it attempts to answer a query after a history of ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)), and its utility
if it ignores the query. If the difference is positive, then an n-period equilibrium exists,
as was proven in Lemma 5.1. It is also clear that as the difference increases, the n-period
equilibrium will exist for a larger set of parameters. As can be seen in the figure, the
trigger equilibrium does not exist for n values higher than 6. This limit will be different
for different parameter values, but the conclusion is clear. There is a trade off between the
expected utility and the existence of a trigger equilibrium: as n increases, the expected
utility of the agents increases, while the trigger equilibrium exists for a smaller set of
configurations.
The conclusion from this section is that given a configuration of parameters, ω, the
agents can decide about the optimal n to be used. Thus, they will choose the largest n
for which a trigger equilibrium still exists, i.e., it is still beneficial for agent A to answer
queries given a history of ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)), and it is still beneficial for agent B to
answer queries given a history of ((0, . . . ,0), (1, . . . ,1)). Testing these conditions can be
done by using a computation method based on the formulas of V n,hA and U
n,h
A , as described
in Section 5.2.
5.3. Punishment after k unanswered queries from n
In the previous sections, we considered strategies in which punishment is done after
one, two or any other predefined number of subsequent unanswered queries. We found
that as the number of unanswered queries required for punishment increases, the expected
utility of the agents increases, but the number of configurations for which equilibrium
exists decreases. In this section, we consider a new type of strategy profiles. As in the
previous section, n periods of history are considered by the agent when it has to decide
when to punish its opponent. The difference in this strategy is in the fact that it is ample to
observe k  n queries with no answer in order to decide about a punishment. The model
considered in Section 5.2 is a special case of this model, with the restriction of k = n.
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In fact, our model includes more possible combinations of strategies that may yield a
higher expected utility. In particular, there are configurations, and values of n, for which
the equilibrium of the n-period model does not exist, but there are strategy profiles in
equilibrium, in which punishment is done after k unanswered queries from n, for the
same n. Such a strategy profile may often be more beneficial than choosing a smaller n
and using the n-period observation strategies. In this section, we will consider the k from
n-period observation model. First, we present important notations and we discuss some of
the properties of the k/n-model. Finally we suggest how to choose the best value of k and
n given a particular configuration.
We denote Ωk,n to be the set of configurations for which the strategy profile of
punishment after k unanswered queries from n, is in equilibrium. We denote by h =
(hA,hB) the history of the n last results of queries sent to agent A and the n last queries
sent to agent B . We denote V k,n,hi the utility of agent i when it is its turn to answer, given
history h, and assuming a model of punishment after k unanswered queries from n queries.
Similarly, Uk,n,hi is the utility of agent i when it is its turn to ask a query, given history h,
for a model of punishment after k unanswered queries from n queries.
Similar to Section 5.2, the expected utility V k,n,hA of agent A when required to answer a
query, is defined as follows:
V
k,n,h
A =


(DAUk,n,(hA,hB)A ) sum_zeroes(hB) k,
−oA+ pA · (−cA +DAUk,n,(hA1,hB)A )
+ (1− pA)(DV k,n,(hA0,hB)A ) sum_zeroes(hA 0)
 k,
−oA+ pA · (−cA +DAUk,n,(hA1,hB)A )
+ (1− pA)(DAUk,n,(hA0,hB)A ) otherwise
(22)
and the expected utility Uk,n,hA of agent A when it asks a query, is defined as follows:
U
k,n,h
A =


(DBUk,n,(hA,hB)B ) sum_zeroes(hA) k,
pB · (vA +DBV k,n,(hA,hB1)A )
+ (1− pB)(DUk,n,(hA,hB0)A ) sum_zeroes(hB  0)+ 1 k,
pB · (vA +DBV k,n,(hA,hB1)A )
+ (1− pB)(DBV k,n,(hA,hB0)A ) otherwise.
(23)
The intuition behind these formulas is the same as in the model of punishing after n
consequent failures. If it is agent A’s turn to answer a query, then it may just ignore it, if
there are at least k failures from n last queries to agent B . If it has to attempt to answer
the query, then with a probability of pA it will succeed and with a probability of (1− pA)
it will fail. In a case of a failure, a punishment mode can be reached, if there are at least
k unanswered queries from n last queries to A, including the current failure. (If agent A
punishes agent B and ignores its query, this punishment will not be saved in the history.)
Similarly, if it is agent A’s turn to receive an answer to a query, and agent A has at
least k unanswered queries, i.e., it is agent A’s punishment phase, then its query will be
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ignored. Otherwise, agentB will attempt to answer the query. It will receive an answer with
a probability of pB and with a probability of (1− pB) agent B will not find an answer. In
this case, if there are at least k failures of agent B , then agent A will punish agent B .
The difference between the two models is the condition for a punishment event to take
place. Punishment in the n-period model is implemented after n unanswered queries, i.e.,
if all the n− 1 events in the history of an agent are zeroes. Punishment in the k/n-period
model is implemented when there are k unanswered queries from the history of length n,
i.e., if the sum of unanswered queries is greater than or equal to k.
For the expected utility calculation the agent has to use an algorithm based on the
formulas V k,n,hA and U
k,n,h
A . As in the n-period model, the formulas depend on each
other and can be solved using a divide and conquer algorithm or a dynamic programming
algorithm. However, in this model, all the possibilities of histories with a length of n
have to be considered since the utility of one history depends on the utility of other
histories (with an additional success, or with an additional failure). A failure can cause
a future punishment even if there was a later success after this failure. (Only the number of
consequent last failures has to be considered in the n-period model, since a failure with a
later success has no meaning.) Thus, all the possible combinations of histories of length n
have to be considered in our model, i.e., there are 22n possible combinations of histories to
be evaluated.4 Given that this number is exponential in n, the best algorithm for evaluating
V
k,n,h
A or for checking the existence of the equilibrium should take at least exponential
time.
5.3.1. Properties of the model
Given the ability to use a trigger strategy profile in which punishment is imposed after
k from n unanswered queries, we would like to suggest how the values of k and n should
be chosen by the agents. This is an important decision that influences the utilities of the
agents, as well as their motivation to use the equilibrium strategies. In this section, we will
check the influence of k and n in order to suggest how the agents should choose them.
We start by formally proving certain properties, and we proceed by testing other important
properties via simulations.
5.3.2. The influence of k
In order to prove the influence of k on the equilibrium existence, we start with two
auxiliary lemmas. First, we prove that an equilibrium exists whenever it is worthwhile for
each agent i to answer the query of its opponent even with the best history for i . Denote
by best_casei (k, n) the best history for agent i . This history includes no failures of i , but
the maximum number of allowed failures of j . In other words, in best_caseA(k,n) there
are n − 1 last successes of agent A, and k − 1 recent failures (from n) at the end of the
history of agent B . If it is worthwhile for agent i to answer the query of agent j even in
this history, it will be worthwhile for i to answer the queries for any other history.
4 During agent A’s punishment mode queries to agent or from agent A are ignored until it succeeds in
answering a query. Thus, a history of n length for agent A and n length for agent B is sufficient to represent
all the required information for future decisions.
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Lemma 5.5. Consider an equilibrium of a strategy profile where each agent answers the
queries of its opponent, unless there was no response to at least k queries from the last n
queries sent to this opponent. An equilibrium will exist, if it is worthwhile for each agent
i to attempt to answer agent j after the best_casei (k, n) history of n − 1 consecutive
answered queries by agent i , and k − 1 consecutive unanswered queries of agent j .
According to the above lemma, the equilibrium of the k from n-period observation
strategies is stable if, and only if, these strategies are stable after the history of n − 1
consecutive answered queries by agent i , and k − 1 consecutive unanswered queries of
agent j , for i = A,j = B and for i = B,j = A. In order to check whether an equilibrium
exists or not, based on this reasoning we only have to check the condition for the history
of best_caseA(k,n) and best_caseB(k,n).
Lemma 5.6. Given the best_casei (k, n) history of exactly k − 1 consecutive last failures
of agent j and n− 1 consecutive successes of agent i ,
ignr_lossi
(
ω,k,n,best_casei (k, n)
)
> ignr_lossi
(
ω,k + 1, n,best_casei (k + 1, n)
)
.
Based on the above lemmas, the next theorem summarizes our results concerning the
influence of k on the conditions of the equilibrium. We prove that as k increases an
equilibrium holds for a smaller set of configurations.
Theorem 5.3. If k1< k2 n, then Ωk2,n ⊆Ωk1,n.
According to the above theorems, the equilibrium tends to be weaker as k increases
when keeping n fixed. This result is intuitively clear, since as k increases punishment
becomes rarer. This causes the threat of punishment to decrease, and it may also harm
the stability of the strategy profiles. Thus, we can assume that as k increases, the expected
utility of the agents will increase, but the equilibrium will hold more rarely.
5.3.3. Simulation results
In order to check the influence of different values of k and n on particular configurations
and histories, we developed an algorithm based on dynamic-programming, as explained
above. This algorithm is able to run for different strategy profiles, based on different values
of k and n.
After implementing this algorithm, we ran a simulation which randomly generated
configurations ω and histories h, and checked how different values of k and n influence
the utility, and the equilibrium existence, given ω and h. The values of the configurations
were generated as follows: qA, qB , pA and pB were drawn randomly from 0 to 1. δ was
drawn randomly from 0.9 to 1. The value of δ is near 1, since the loss from a delay of
one-period should be small. vA was drawn from 0 to 100, cA was drawn from 0 to 0.1, and
oA was drawn from 0 to 0.01. We chose these cost parameter values since we wanted the
equilibrium to exist for different values of k and n. This type of relation between the cost
of acquiring information and the benefits from it often appear in knowledge sharing, where
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Table 1
Influence of n and k on: (a) the average utility; (b) the ratio of configurations for which an equilibrium exists. The
format is (a)/(b)%
n k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
1 74.6/99.59%
2 59.7/99.72% 98.2/71.3%
3 53.5/99.74% 84.8/81.2% 110.1/50.0%
4 50.5/99.74% 78.3/82.8% 99.2/57.7% 117.0/33.4%
5 48.9/99.74% 74.9/83.2% 93.2/58.5% 108.3/42.5% 121.4/22.3%
6 47.9/99.74% 72.9/83.7% 89.8/58.1% 103.2/43.1% 114.5/30.7% 124.4/14.7%
the agent which asks a query can greatly benefit from an answer, but the agent which has
to answer it incurs a cost. Though the cost may be low it may still be significant.
For simplification, we checked only the expected utility of agent A, and the equilibrium
existence from the point of view of agent A. The influence on agent B should be, on
average, identical, since it has the same utility function and equilibrium existence index,
and the configuration values are randomly generated.
We first ran a simulation with 10,000 sets of parameters in order to check the influence
of k and n on the average utility and on the equilibrium existence index. Table 1 presents
the average values of the expected utility of agent A, and the ratio of the configuration in
equilibrium from all the configurations checked, given different configuration values.
In Table 1, we can see that as k increases, and as n decreases, the average expected utility
increases, and the ratio of the configurations in equilibrium decreases. The intuition behind
this result is that as the number of unanswered queries required for punishing, k, increases,
then punishment is inflicted more rarely. Thus, in general, the expected utility of the agents
increases while their tendency to follow the equilibrium decreases. As the number of
periods tested in order to punish, n, increases, punishment will be performed more often,
and for a longer time. Consequently, the expected utility of the agents decreases but the
threat of a punishment is stronger showing that the equilibrium exists more frequently.
The above table presents the average direction of the influence of k and n. However, we
also wanted to test whether this direction of influence exists for all configurations, and not
only on the average. In order to do so, we ran a simulation for each of the above changes
in k or in n, and tried to find a counter example with the opposite direction of the average
change. First, we checked how the increase of k influences each configuration tested. As
we explained above, as more unanswered queries are required in order to punish, agent i’s
punishment is performed more rarely, increasing the expected utility of agent i . However,
as k increases, the punishment of the opponent j is also performed more rarely, meaning
that agent i has to attempt to answer more queries.
We first ran an additional set of simulations for varied histories. In most of our
simulations, results show that as k increases the expected utility of an agent increases.
But, there were also examples, given varied histories, where increasing k, causes the
expected utility V k,n,hA to decrease. We observed that all the cases where the expected
utility decreases when k increases were always in situations where the history includes at
least one failure of one of the agents.
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However, the process of determining the values of k and n is performed before the
repeated interaction starts. Thus, the agents decide to prefer (k1, n1) over strategy (k2, n2),
if strategy (k1, n1) has a higher expected utility, given the history before the repeated
interaction starts. Since the interaction starts with no unanswered queries, the agents should
consider only a history of ((1, . . . ,1), (1, . . . ,1)) when they decide about their strategy,
given that this decision is done once and before any query was even sent: the choice of
n and k cannot to be taken during the interaction itself. We ran our simulation for 10,000
configuration values, given the history of ((1, . . . ,1), (1, . . . ,1)). In all the configurations
we tested, the expected utility of the agents increases as k increases. (We did not prove
this formally, because of the complexity of the model.) This result is interesting, since it
shows that the direction of the influence on the utility also depends on the history of a given
sequence of interactions and not only on the configuration. The intuition behind this effect
is that there are other histories, for example, best_caseA(k,n), where the punishment of
agent B will almost certainly be performed. In such situations, agent A may sometimes be
motivated to use a more threatening mechanism, since this will almost surely affect agent
B and increase the utility of agent A. However, as we explained above, the history given
when the agents decide about their strategies is ((1, . . . ,1), (1, . . . ,1)). So only this history
has to be considered.
Recall from Theorem 5.3 that as k increases, the equilibrium holds for a more restricted
set of configurations. We can summarize these two conclusions and say that given a value
of n, as k increases the utility of the agents increases, but the equilibrium holds more rarely.
Thus, we can conclude that given the value of n, the agents will be motivated to choose the
highest possible k for which the (k, n) pair is in equilibrium.
However, there is no uniform rule of how to choose n. In our simulations we found that
on the average, as n increases the utility decreases while the equilibrium exists for more
cases. However, there were also counter examples. Even when we check the influence on
the utility function given a history of ((1, . . . ,1), (1, . . . ,1)), there still are cases in which
the increase of n causes V k,n,hA to increase.
We ran our simulation for k = 2 and n increases from 5 to 6, and we ran 10,000
configurations. For 83.7% of the configurations that are in equilibrium, we found that as n
increases the utility decreases. For 3.3% of the configurations that are not in equilibrium
for n = 5 or for n = 6, equilibrium starts to exist as n increases to 6, and for 1.1% of
these configurations, the equilibrium starts to exist as n decreases to 5. So we can conclude
that given a configuration ω, the direction of the influence of n on the utility and on the
existence of equilibrium, depends on ω, although the average direction is clear. Thus, if the
agents would like to be certain that they are taking the best value of n for a given k, they
should check all the possible values of n, given a configuration ω.
Table 2 summarizes our conclusions considering the change of n in the n-model, and
the change of k or n in the k/n-model. The results are based on a simulation of over 10,000
configurations of parameters. There are cells with proven directions, and according to our
simulations there are cells with and without uniform directions.
A typical demonstration is presented in Fig. 14, for a particular configurationω= (ci =
1, oi = 0.1, vi = 20,pi = 0.5,Di = 0.9). In this example, we can see that as k increases,
and as n decreases, the expected utility of agent A increases, while the equilibrium
exists more rarely. In this example, the pair k = n = 3 maximizes the expected utility
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Table 2
The influence of changing n or k, on the expected utility and on the existence of an equilibrium, as found
theoretically or by simulations. The influence direction of cells with the indication (simulation), was obtained
by simulation. The influence direction of cells with the indication (proven), was proven
Utility Utility Number of configurations
any history history ((1, . . . ,1), (1, . . . ,1)) in equilibrium
n-model, n increases ↑ ↑ ↓
(proven) (proven) (proven)
k/n-model k increases on average ↑ always ↑ ↓
(simulation) (simulation) (proven)
k/n-model n increases on average ↓ on average ↓ on average, ↑
(simulation) (simulation) (simulation)
Fig. 14. Punishment after k failures from n: expected utility and trigger equilibrium conditions as a function of
k/n.
of both agents, while the trigger equilibrium still exists. Thus, the agents should choose the
equilibrium based on this pair. However, for other examples, the optimal pair is different,
and the optimal value of k is often different from n.
We can see that different values of k and n may yield different values of the expected
utility and their particular value determines the existence of the trigger equilibrium. Recall
that given a configuration of parameters, the agents have to find the pair of k and n for
which the trigger equilibrium exists, and to choose the optimal pair (k, n) from among
them. As we explain above, in order to evaluate the expected utility and the equilibrium
conditions, the agents should examine all the possible histories, since the utility given a
particular history depends on the utilities for other histories (with an additional success, or
with an additional failure). There are 22n possible values of histories. Thus, the evaluation
of one pair (k, n) requires exponential time, in view of the fact that all the possible histories
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can occur. Accordingly, only feasible values of n should be examined, and the agents
should determine a value maxn, which is the largest value of n that is feasible and check
all the values of n= 1,2, . . . ,maxn.
Given a particular value of n, according to our conclusions, as k increases, the utility
increases while the conditions hold less frequently. Thus, we can conclude that for each fea-
sible value of n, the agents will run a binary search in order to find best_k(n), which is the
largest value of k for which the equilibrium holds, for a given n. Then, they will compare
the values of the different pairs (n,best_k(n)), and choose the optimal value among them.
There may be situations in which each agent will prefer a different pair (k, n) due to
different parameters’ values of the different agents. For example, suppose that there are
two possible pairs in equilibrium: k = 2, n = 4 and k = 3, n = 5. Suppose also that one
agent prefers the pair k = 2, n= 4, while the other agent prefers the pair k = 3, n= 5. In
such cases, the agents can determine a rule of how to choose (k, n), such as, maximizing
their average expected utility or maximizing the product of the expected utility.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present the problem of sharing information among self motivated
agents. An agent receives queries and decides whether or not to attempt to answer them.
Mainly, we considered an alternating model, where at each time period each agent may
have a query. First, we introduced the one-period strategy profile, in which each agent
observes the last history event of its opponent in order to decide whether or not to answer
it. Second, we introduced the model of punishing an agent after n unanswered queries. We
found that as n increases the expected utility of the agents increases, while there are more
situations in which a trigger equilibrium does not exist. We also considered the general
case, where punishment is implemented after k unanswered queries from n queries, and
we checked the influence of changing k and n.
In conclusion, we found that different punishment-based strategy profiles can be
appropriate to attain responses in situations where attempting to answer queries is costly
and may result in success or failure. These profiles are stable and increase the expected
utility of the agents. Moreover, given a specific configuration the agents may choose a
strategy profile which maximizes the average or product of their expected utility, while a
trigger equilibrium still exists.
Appendix A. Table of symbols
Table A.1
Table of symbols
Symbol Explanation Appears
A,B components of Ui in the alternating model Lemma 4.4
vi the utility of agent i for answering its query 4
ci the cost of agent i in the case of success 4
δ the discount factor of the utility function of the agents 4.2
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Symbol Explanation Appears
D the expected discount ratio from the current time, when it is
agent i’s turn to answer until the next time when it is its turn
to answer
4.2
Di the expected discount ratio from the current time until ti 4.2
history the histories of both agents. (historyA,historyB) 5
historyi the results of the n− 1 last events of queries sent to agent i (each
result is 1 for an answered query, 0 for a query with no answer)
(n-period model)
5
n the number of periods observed in order to decide about a
punishment
5
k the number of failures from n observed periods, for which
punishment is done
5.3
oi the cost of agent i when it tries to answer a query 4
ignr_lossi (ω,n,history) the expected loss of agent i due to failure or ignoring a query 5
{Normal,PunishA,PunishB } the three phases included in the strategy profile Lemma 4.2
pi the probability of agent i to succeed in answering, if it tries to. 4
qi the probability for agent i to have a query in a given time period
(in the stochastic mode)
4.2
t0 the current time 4.2
ti the time when agent i will send a query 4.2
Ui the expected utility for agent i when it is its turn to receive
an answer from agent j = i (whether agent i succeeds or not)
(alternating model)
4.3
U
xy
i
the expected utility of agent i in the two-period model, when the
last event of agent A was x, the last event of agent B was y, and
it is i’s turn to receive an answer from agent j = i (two-period
model)
5.1
U
history,n
i
the expected utility for agent i when it is its turn to receive an
answer from agent j = i given history, in the n-period model
5.2
Vi the expected utility for agent i if it decides to answer the query
of j = i (whether it succeeds or not) (alternating)
4.3
V
xy
i the expected utility of agent i in the two-period model, when the
last event of agent A was x, the last event of agent B was y, and
it is now agent i’s turn to answer a query
5.1
V
n,history
i the expected utility for agent i when it is its turn to answer the
query of j = i, in the n-period model
5.2
Fi the utility of agent i from deviating to the one-stage equilibrium,
and ignoring the query of agent j = i (alternating)
4.3
ω a combination of the parameters of the model 5
Ω a set of all the combinations of model parameters 5
Ωn a set of all the combinations of the model parameters which
are stable for a strategy profile based on punishment after n
consequent failures
5
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Appendix B. ProofsProof of Lemma 4.1. Based on equation (1), DA is defined as δqA/(1− δ(1− qA)). In
order to prove thatDA  0, we have to prove that the numerator is greater than or equal to 0,
and that the denominator is positive. Since δ  0 and qA  0, it is clear that the numerator
is greater than or equal to 0. The denominator is positive whenever 1− δ(1− qA) > 0.
This holds whenever δ(1− qA) < 1, and this is true, since δ < 1 and 0 qA  1.
In order to prove that DA < 1, we have to prove that δqA < 1− δ(1− qA), i.e., δ < 1,
and this is true by definition. Symmetrically, also DB is between 0 and 1, and the proof is
based on Eq. (1).
As proven, 0DA < 1. Symmetrically, 0DB < 1. According to Eq. (2),D=DADB .
Thus, 0D < 1. ✷
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Consider the strategy profile defined in Section 4.1. If VA  FA, and
agent B uses the above strategy, then any attempt of agent A to deviate from any history,
will reduce its utility.
Suppose agent B sends a query to agent A; There are three possible phases of the game:
PunishB : In this phase, if agent A punishes agent B , then it saves the cost of cA. Whether
it answers or not, the next state will be PunishB . Thus, it is clear that A prefers to
punish B in state PunishB .
Normal and PunishA: In both phases, if agent A will attempt to answer agent B’s query,
then its utility will be VA, and if it decides to deviate and ignore the query, its
utility will be FA. Thus, the condition for answering is VA  FA.
The same arguments also apply to the case when agent A sends a query to agent B . So
the conditions needed for the equilibrium to hold are VA  FA, and VB  FB . ✷
Proof of Lemma 4.3. By manipulating the formulas of Attribute 4.1, and solving the
recursive formulas, we obtain
UA = pB ∗ vA1+D(pB − 1) +
DB ∗ pBVA
1+D(pB − 1) .
We use the notation
A= pB ∗ vA
1+D(pB − 1) , (B.1)
and
B = DB ∗ pB
1+D(pB − 1) (B.2)
so UA =A+BVA.
Recall from Attribute 4.1, that VA =−oA + pA(−cA +DAUA)+ (1− pA)FA.
By substituting FA, we obtain,
VA =−oA + pA(−cA +DAUA)+ (1− pA)DVA.
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By substituting UA, we obtain,VA =−oA + pA(−cA +DA(A+BVA)+ (1− pA)DVA.
By eliminating VA, we obtain,
VA(1− pADAB− (1− pA)D)=−oA+ pA(−cA +DAA)
and the value of VA is
VA = −oA − pAcA + pADAA1− pADAB− (1− pA)D
and when opening the formula, we finally obtain
VA = (1+DpB −D)(−oA − pAcA)+ pADApBvA
(1+DpB −D)(1−D+DpA)− pADpB . ✷
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Substituting B in Eq. (8), we obtain
1− pADA DB ∗ pB1+D(pB − 1) −D(1− pA) > 0.
Since it is clear that 1+D(pB − 1) > 0, we only have to prove that
1+D(pB − 1)− pADADB ∗ pB +D(pA − 1)
(
1+D(pB − 1)
)
> 0
and since D=DA +DB ,
1+D(pB − 1− pApB − 1+ pA)+D2(pApB − pA − pB + 1)
and
1+D(−2+ pA + pB −pApB)+D2(1− pA − pB + pApB)
and this is equal to
1+ (D2 − 2D)+ pApB(D2 −D)+ (pA + pB)(D−D2).
(D2 − 2D) is minimized when D approaches one, thus (D2 − 2D)→−1, so we are left
with
pApB
(D2 −D)+ (pA + pB)(D−D2)
which is equal to (D−D2)(pA + pB − pApB) which is positive. ✷
Proof of Lemma 4.4. According to Lemma 4.3, the expected utility of an agent when
attempting to answer a query, is
VA = −oA − pAcA + pADAA1− pADAB−D(1− pA) .
According to Lemma 4.2, there is an equilibrium when VA  FA and VB  FB .
According to Attribute 4.1, FA =DVA. As we proved in Lemma 4.1,D ∈ [0, . . . ,1). Using
this is a necessary and sufficient condition to prove that FA < VA is VA  0.
According to Lemma 4.2, there is an equilibrium whenever VA  FA, and VB  FB .
However, according to Attribute 4.1, FA is defined to be DVA, and D was proved in
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Lemma 4.1 to be between 0 and 1. Thus, VA  FA whenever VA  0, since in any case
when VA  0, FA =DVA < VA
According to Proposition 4.1, the denominator of VA is positive. In the following
formula, we will find under which conditions the numerator will also be positive. In other
words, we have to find whenever pADAA pAcA+ oA. pA ∈ (0,1), so pA > 0. Thus, we
can maintain that DAA> cA + oA/pA. Substituting A with its formula, we receive,
DA pBvA1+D(pB − 1)  cA +
oA
pA
and,
vA  cA
(1+D(pB − 1))
DApB + oA
(1+D(pB − 1))
pApBDA
and,
vA  cA
(
1
DApB +
DB(pB − 1)
pB
)
+EA
(
1
pApBDA +
DB(pB − 1)
pApB
)
.
Substituting DA with δqA/(1− δ+ δqA) and DB with δqB/(1− δ+ δqB), and D with
DADB , we obtain
vA  cA
(
1− δ+ δqA
δqApB
+ δqB(pB − 1)
pB(1− δ+ δqB)
)
+ oA
(
1− δ+ δqA
pApBδqA
+ δqB(pB − 1)
(1− δ+ δqB)pApB
)
.
In other words,
vA 
(
cA + oA
pA
)(
1− δ+ δqA
δqApB
+ δqB(pB − 1)
pB(1− δ+ δqB)
)
. (B.3)
Symmetrical arguments will lead to the symmetrical formula for the case where agent
B has to answer. ✷
Proof of Lemma 4.5. First, in Eq. (10) of Lemma 4.4, the equilibrium condition is
presented as a ratio between vApA and cApA + oA, and this ratio should be larger than
another term, that is a function of the other parameters. So it is clear that as vA increases,
the condition is inclined to hold, and as cA or oA increases, the condition may be violated.
The influence of cA, oA and vA on the utility function can be shown using the formula
of VA. According to Lemma 4.3,
VA = (1+DpB −D)(−oA − pAcA)+ pADApBvA
(1+DpB −D)(1−D+DpA)− pADpB
and we already proved in Lemma 4.1 that the denominator is positive. Thus, it is clear that
the influence direction of oA and cA is linearly negative, with less influence of oA, while
the influence direction of vA is linearly positive (since it is easy to show that its coefficient
is positive).
We proceed by proving that as pA or pB increases, the expected utility of each agent
increases, and the set of parameter values for which equilibrium exists, increases too.
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We start with proving that pA and pB positively influence VA. Manipulating Eq. (6) of
Lemma 4.3,
VA = (1+DpB −D)(−oA − pAcA)+ pADApBvA
(1+DpB −D)(1−D+DpA)− pADpB .
When isolating pA, we obtain
VA = −oA(1+DpBcA −D)+ pA(−cA −DpB −DcA +DApBvA)
(1−D)(1+DpB −D)+ pA(D+D2pB −D2 −DpB) .
Since D < 1, −oA(1+DpBcA −D) < 0, if the equilibrium holds, then the numerator
is positive. So (−cA−DpB −DcA+DApBvA) > 0. The denominator includes two parts,
but since D < 1, (1 − D)(1 + DpB − D) > 0. Thus, as pA is multiplied, the numerator
increases more than the denominator, so the value of VA increases.
A similar proof is true for the influence of pB on VA. The formula of VA can be written
as
pB(−oAD− pADcA +pADAvA)+ (−oA+ oAD− pAcA + pADcA)
pB(D−D2 + pAD2 −DpA)+ (1− 2D+D2 + pAD− pADcA) .
The second part of the numerator can also be written (D−1)(oA+pAcA), and this value is
negative sinceD < 1. Thus, the first part of the numerator must be positive when there is an
equilibrium. The second part of the denominator can be written as (D−1)(D(1−pA)−1).
Both parts of the expression are negative, so the expression on the whole is positive. Again,
as pB is multiplied, there is a greater effect on the numerator (where one part depends on
pB and the other part is negative) than on the denominator (where the part which does not
depend on pB is positive). Thus, as pB increases, VA increases too.
Agent A’s willingness to attempt to answer queries is positively influenced by
increasing pA or pB . This influence can be easily shown from the condition VA(1−D) 0.
Since pA and pB increase vA, they also increase the equilibrium condition, given the other
parameters stay constant. ✷
Proof of Lemma 4.6. First, we prove that as δ increases, Di also increases. According to
Eq. (1),
Di = δqi1− δ(1− qi) .
As δ increases, the numerator increases, while the denominator decreases. Thus, as δ
increases, Di increases.
We proceed by proving that as qA or qB increases, Di increases too. The value of Di
can be written as
Di = δqi1− δ + δqi
so, as qi increases with a ratio r , the numerator increases in the same ratio r , while part of
the denominator increases in ratio r . However, the rest of the denominator (1− δ) remains
unchanged. Since this part is positive (δ < 1), the denominator at whole will increase with
a ratio less than r . Thus, the numerator increases with a ratio larger than the increased ratio
of the denominator, so the value of Di increases.
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According to Eq. (2),
D =DADB.
We showed that as δ increases, DA and DB increase, D also increases. Similarly, as qA
increases, DA increases while DB remains unchanged, and as qB increases, DB increases
while DA remains unchanged. Thus, as qA or qB increases, D increases.
We will now show that as DA or DB increases, the expected utility VA also increases.
Following Lemma 4.3, the value of VA can be written as
VA = (1+ (pB − 1)D)neg+ pADApos
(1+ (pB − 1)D)(1+ (pA − 1)D− pApBD ,
where neg = (−oA − pAcA) is negative, and pos = pBvA is positive. As D increases,
the value of (1 + (pB − 1)D) decreases, and becomes closer to 0. Since this value is
multiplied with neg, the numerator increases as D increases. Moreover, as DA increases,
an additional positive influence exists since pADApos also increases, so both parts of the
numerator increase as DA increases. If DB increases while DA is unchanged,D increases.
As a result the numerator’s left side will increase and the numerator will increase. Thus,
we have shown that as DA or DB or both increase, the numerator increases too.
In addition, asD increases, the denominator decreases, since (1+(pB−1)D) decreases,
(1+ (pA−1)D) decreases, and pApBD, which appears as a negative factor, increases. So,
we can conclude that as D,DA or DB increases, the value of VA increases. To summarize,
as δ, qA or qB increases, D increases, and DA or DB or both increase too. Thus, as δ, qA
or qB increases, D increases, and VA increases.
We proceed by proving the influence on the equilibrium condition. Manipulating
Eq. (10) of Lemma 4.4, the equilibrium holds whenever
vi
ci + oipi
 1Dipj +
Dj (pj − 1)
pj
.
AsD increases, 1/(Dipj ) decreases. Since (pj −1) < 1,Dj (pj − 1)/pj decreases too.
So, as D increases, the minimum value of vi/(ci + oi/pi) for which the equilibrium exists
decreases, and therefore an equilibrium exists for more configurations. To summarize, as
δ, qA or qB increases,D increases, and the equilibrium exists for more configurations. ✷
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Consider the equilibrium conditions for agent A, and consider a
case in which attempting to answer is beneficial given history = ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)).
Suppose that agent A receives a query after that history, and suppose also that both agents
follow their equilibrium strategies. In this case, if agent A doesn’t answer a punishment of
agentAwill occur with a probability of (1−pA)n−1, since n−1 future failures are required
in order for a punishment event to occur. If such a punishment will be imposed, this will
occur only after at least n− 1 queries events to agent A. (A longer delay of n-period may
occur if during this time, agent B was punished.)
It is beneficial for agent A to attempt to answer a query, if and only if its expected
loss due to answering the query is not more than its loss due to ignoring the query.
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i.e., oA + pAcA + (1 − pA)ignr_lossA(ω,n,history)  ignr_lossA(ω,n,history). Thus,
equilibrium exists if,
ignr_lossA(ω,n,history) cA +
oA
pA
.
Now, consider a history that is different from ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)). There may be
three possible situations of histories:
(1) The last event of agent A was a successful answer: history ((. . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)).
(2) The end of the history of agent A contains at least one failure: history ((. . . ,0),
(0, . . . ,0)).
(3) The history of agent B contains at least one success: history ((. . .), (. . . ,1, . . .).
First consider case (1). Any state with the same history of agent B , and where the last event
in the history of agent A is 1, is equivalent to ours, in the model where punishing is done
after n consequent failures, since a present ignorance of a query by agent A will cause a
punishment of A only after additional n− 1 unanswered queries.
Now, consider case (2). In any state with one failure or more at the end of agent
A’s history, ignr_lossA(ω,n,history) will be higher than after a history of ((1, . . . ,1),
(0, . . . ,0)), since less failures of agent A are required in order to punish it. (If there are
k failures at the end of agent A’s history, then the probability of punishment because of
a current unanswered query, is (1− p)n−1−k , and this may occur after a delay of at least
n− 1− k queries events.)
Finally, consider case (3). In any case with one success or more in agent B’s history, the
probability of punishment of agentB is lower than after a history of ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)),
since more than one consequent failure of agent B is required in order to punish it. Any
punishment of agent B causes a delay in the answers required by agent A. Thus, if the
probability of punishing agent B decreases, the expected delay of time until agent A will
be punished increases, so ignr_lossA(ω,n,history) also increases.
To summarize, ignr_lossA(ω,n,history) for any given history, is higher than or equal
to
ignr_lossA
(
ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))
)
.
Thus, if after a history of ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)), still
ignr_lossA
(
ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))
)
> cA + oA
pA
,
this will also hold for the other histories. In other words, if the equilibrium exists after a
history of ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)) for agent A, and after a history of ((0, . . . ,0), (1, . . . ,1))
for agent B , it will also exist after any history.
Finally, if an equilibrium exists, then each agent will answer the query of its opponent.
In particular, each agent will do this given the history of ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)) and the
history of ((0, . . . ,0), (1, . . . ,1)). ✷
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Consider a history of ((x,1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0)), in the n + 1-
period model. This means that at least the last n− 1 events of agent A are successes, and
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exactly the last n− 1 events were unanswered queries by agent B . Consider now reducing
n + 1 to n. This will increase the probability of punishing agent A after an event of not
answering (pn−1A instead of pnA). Moreover, the possible punishment, if performed, may
be done earlier (after n − 1 consecutive failures instead of n), and this will increase the
present value of the loss due to punishment.
On the other hand, reducing the number of periods observed in the strategies also causes
a possible punishment of agent B to be imposed earlier and with a higher probability. There
are three situations:
• If the next event of agent B is a successful answer: then no punishment is given in both
models at the next n periods.
• If the next event of agent B is a failure, and the consequent event is a success: then a
punishment is given to agent B in the n-period model, and no punishment is inflicted
in the n+ 1-period model.
• if the next k (2 or more) consecutive events of agent B are failures: then k punishments
of agent B will be performed in the n-period model, and k − 1 punishments of agent
B will be performed in the n+ 1-period model.
Thus, moving from the n+ 1-period model to the n-period model causes at least one
more punishment of agent B , given a history of n − 1 failures of agent B . This one
punishment will make the future possible punishment of agent A to be one query event
later. Namely, if a punishment event occurs, then agent A is exempt from answering one
query, so the possible punishment of agent A is delayed.
To summarize, as n + 1 decreases to n, punishment of agent A will occur with a
probability of (1 − pA)n instead of (1 − pA)n+1, and this possible punishment will
be at the same expected future time as in the n-period model, or even earlier. (The
possibility of punishing B causes the time of punishment agent A to increase by one
query event or to remain unchanged. However, this time of punishment decreases by one
query since less failures of agent A are required in order to punish.) Thus, as n increases,
ignr_lossA(ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))) decreases, and, in particular,
ignr_lossA
(
ω,n+ 1, ((x,1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0)))
 (1− pA)ignr_lossA
(
ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))
)
. ✷
Proof of Lemma 5.1. First, we show that for each ω ∈Ωn+1, ω ∈Ωn. If ω ∈Ωn+1, then,
in particular, after a history of last n − 1 successes of agent A and last n − 1 failures
of agent B , it is still beneficial for agent A to attempt to answer agent B’s query. This
means that the cost of answering is less than or equal to the expected loss from avoiding
answering, i.e.,
oA + pAcA + (1− pA)ignr_lossA
(
ω,n+ 1, ((x,1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0))))
 ignr_lossA
(
ω,n+ 1, ((x,1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0))),
and,
oA
pA
+ cA  ignr_lossA
(
ω,n+ 1, ((x,1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0))).
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According to Lemma 5.2,ignr_lossA
(
ω,n+ 1, ((x,1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0)))
< ignr_lossA
(
ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))
)
.
Thus, if
oA
pA
+ cA  δAignr_lossA
(
ω,n+ 1, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)))
this holds also for the n-period model, so
oA
pA
+ cA  δAignr_lossA
(
ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))
)
.
Based on Lemma 5.1, if answering is beneficial for agent A given a configuration ω, and
after n−1 consequent successes of agent A and n−1 consequent failures of agent B , then
it is in equilibrium for each history. Thus, ω ∈Ωn.
Now, we show that ω ∈Ωn exists such that ω /∈Ωn+1. In particular, we take ω such that
oA
pA
+ cA = ignr_lossA
(
ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))
)
.
An equilibrium exists for this ω given the n-period model. Then, as the strategy profile is
changed to be an n+ 1-strategy profile, ignr_lossA decreases, so
oA
pA
+ cA < ignr_lossA
(
ω,n+ 1, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))).
In other words, it is no longer beneficial for agent A to attempt to answer the query of
agent B , so ω /∈Ωn+1. ✷
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Given ω ∈Ω , and given n, we can consider the situation of a history
of ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)), i.e., n−1 consequent successes of agentA and n−1 consequent
failures of agent B . Given n, we can evaluate the expected loss of avoiding answering
a query (ignr_lossA(ω,n,history)) where history = ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0)), and ω ∈ Ωn
whenever this loss is larger than cA + oA/pA, as we explained above.
However, as proved in Lemma 5.2,
ignr_lossA
(
ω,n+ 1, ((x,1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0)))
 (1− pA)ignr_lossA
(
ω,n, ((1, . . . ,1), (0, . . . ,0))
)
.
Thus, ignr_lossA(ω,n,history) when moving from n to n + 1 decreases by a factor
of at least 1− pA, so for n→∞, ignr_lossA(ω,n,history) approaches 0. Therefore, it is
also clear that if ignr_lossA(ω,m,history) > cA+oA/pA for a particular m, m′ >m exists
such that
ignr_lossA(ω,m′,history) < cA +
oA
pA
,
so ω /∈Ωm′ . Denote n′ =min(m′) such that ω /∈Ωm′ . For each n′ <m′,
ignr_lossA(ω,n′,history) cA +
oA
pA
,
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so ω ∈Ωn′ .
If ω /∈Ω1, then the strategy profile will not be an equilibrium given configuration ω for
any length of history. ✷
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Consider the situation in which agent B answers agent A’s query.
In this case, agent A has a benefit of vA. Consider now the situation in which agent B did
not answer agent A’s query. In the extreme case, this leads agent A to punish agent B , after
a delay of DB . If agent A punishes agent B , agent A saves the cost of oA + pAcA after
a delay of one query event of agent B , and it also saves possible losses due to its failure
to answer a query it was supposed to answer, i.e., it saves ignr_lossA(ω,n,history) with a
probability of 1− pA. Thus, we have to prove that
vA >DB
(
pAcA + oA+ (1− pA)ignr_lossA(ω,n,history)
)
.
Since an equilibrium exists, ω ∈ Ωn, thus, according to Lemma 5.1, ω ∈ Ω1, so an
equilibrium exists for the one-period model. Thus ignr_lossA(ω,n,history)DAvA, since
one failure event in the one-period model can cause one future punishment (preventing
utility of vA), and this future payment can occur after an expected delay of at least DA.
For the same reason, since ω ∈Ω1, it is clear that oA + pAC DApAvA at each stage,
since otherwise it is not worthwhile to attempt to answer a query even in the one-period
model. Thus, it is enough to show that
vA >DB
(DApAvA + (1− pA)DAvA) or vA >DvA
and this is clear, since D < 1. ✷
Proof of Theorem 5.2. First, we show it is enough to check the history ((1, . . . ,1), (1,0,
. . . ,0)) with the last n− 1 successes of agent A and the last n− 1 successes of agent B . If
agent A prefers the profile n+1 over profile n, this will remain true after any other history.
This is because when moving from a strategy profile of n to a strategy profile of n + 1,
agent A earns from the fact that its punishment becomes rarer, and agent A loses from the
fact that it has to answer more queries of agent B .
As the number of successes of agent A increases, its punishment becomes more rare.
Thus, the motivation of agent A to move to profile n+ 1 decreases. (For the most part it
will not be punished in both profiles.) As there are more failures of agent B , its punishment
becomes more abundant. Thus, agent A’s motivation to move to profile n+ 1 decreases.
(Agent B will be punished in both profiles, so the additional benefits due to punishing
agent B more, decreases).
History ((1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0)) includes the highest possible number of agent A’s
successes and agent B’s failures. (An additional failure of agent B will cause a
punishment.) Thus, if it is beneficial for agent A to move to profile n+ 1 given a history
of ((x,1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0)), this will be true after any other history.
Consider a flow of n alternating queries. (n queries from A to B , n queries from B
to A), starting with the history of ((1, . . . ,1), (1,0, . . . ,0)). Denote by exp_delayB(n) the
expected discount of the future due to punishment of agent B , given that agent B will
be punished if its next query fails. Denote by exp_lossA(n) the expected discounted loss
of agent A when it is supposed to answer agent B’s query, when an additional failure of
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agent B will cause a punishment of B , and n failures of A will cause a punishment of A.
This loss contains a future punishment of agent A after n failures of agent A, i.e., with a
probability of (1−pA)n, discounted by Dnexp_failuresB(n+ 1), agent A will lose pBvA.
Thus, exp_lossA(n)= (1− pA)nDnexp_delayB(n)pBvA.
In the following, we analyze the difference in agent A’s utility, due to changing the
strategy profile from profile n to profile n+ 1. We consider the following possible flows of
successes/failures of both agents.
• With a probability of pB , agent B will succeed to answer the current query of agent A.
In this case, in both profiles, agent B will not be punished during the next n alternating
queries (since there will not be n consequence failures of agent B). In this case, the
only possible change from profile n to profile n+ 1 is a possible punishment of agent
A. Since we start with historyA = (1, . . . ,1) this may take place only after n failures to
answer B’s query. During this time, agent B will not be punished, as explained above.
Thus, if agent A will be punished in the future, it will lose a value of pBvA, after a
delay of exactly Dn, and with a probability of (1 − pA)n. The expected value of the
loss due to this punishment is (1−pA)nDnpBvA. (If another failure will take place at
time n+ 1, then agent A will be punished in both profiles.)
• With a probability of 1−pB , agent B will fail to answer the current query of agent A.
Then, after this failure, if profile n+ 1 is in use, agent A is supposed to answer agent
B’s query, but if profile n is in use, agent A is not supposed to answer this query. Any
additional failure of agent B will cause it punishment in both profiles. Consider profile
n+1. When agent A attempts to answer agent B’s query agent A’s cost for attempting
to answer is oA + pAcA. Again, there are 2 situations.
– With a probability of pA, agent A will succeed to answer agent B’s query. In this
case, the last event of A is a success. Thus, in the n+ 1 profile, n+ 1 failures of
agent A are required in order to punish it, while in the n profile, the punishment will
also be performed after n failures. Therefore, the difference is after n failures of
agent A. The expected discounted loss of this failure is exp_lossA(n). Thus, when
moving to the n+ 1-model, agent A earns exp_lossA(n).
– With a probability of 1 − pA, agent A will fail to answer agent B’s query. In this
case, if there are additional n failures of agent A, then agent A will be punished
when using the (n + 1)th model. The probability and delay of this failure is the
same as the probability and delay in the nth model, where agent A was not suppose
to answer the nth query of agent B . So, in this case, there is no difference between
the two profiles.
To summarize, the total expected benefits of agent A from moving from profile n to
profile n + 1, is pBDB((1 − pA)nDnpBvA)+ (1 − pB)pADBDAexp_lossA(n) and this
should be larger than the cost of answering the (n+ 1)th query of agent B , DBDA(1 −
pB)(oA+ pAcA).
pBDB
(
(1− pA)nDnpBvA
)+ (1− pB)pADBDAexp_lossA(n)
>DBDA(1− pB)(oA + pAcA).
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Manipulating this, we obtain,
pB
DA
(
(1− pA)nDnpBvA
)+ (1− pB)pAexp_lossA(n) > (1− pB)(oA + pAcA).
And since exp_delayB(n + 1) < 1, exp_lossA(n) < ((1 − pA)nDnpBvA), so the above
formula is true whenever(
pB
DA
+ (1− pB)pA
)
exp_lossA(n) > (1− pB)(oA + pAcA)
or (
pB
DA
+ (1− pB)pA
)
exp_lossA(n) > (1− pB)(oA + pAcA).
Sinceω ∈Ωn+1, an equilibrium holds in the n+1-model. This means that after a history
of n failures of B and n successes of A, A prefers to answer than to ignore B’s query. A’s
expected loss due to ignoring is, again, exp_lossA(n), since n additional failures of A will
cause punishment, while an expected delay due to punishment of agent B is expected, if
agent B fails in its next query.
In order for the equilibrium to hold,
oA + pAcA + (1− pA)exp_lossA(n) < exp_lossA(n),
i.e.,
exp_lossA(n) >
oA + pAcA
pA
.
We substitute exp_lossA(n) with this smaller value, and then it remains to prove that(
pB
DA
+ (1− pB)pA
)(
oA + pAcA
pA
)
 (1− pB)(oA + pAcA),
(
pB
DA
+ (1− pB)pA
)
oA + pAcA
pA
 (1− pB)(oA +pAcA).
Manipulating this formula, we obtain
pB
DA
 0
and this is true, since in our model pB,DA  0. ✷
Proof of Lemma 5.5. Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.1. Consider a configuration
in which attempting to answer a query is beneficial given history = best_caseA(k,n).
Suppose that agent A receives a query, and also suppose that both agents follow their
equilibrium strategies. In this case, if the current query will not be answered by agent
A, it will receive punishment with a probability of (1 − pA)n−1, since n − 1 future
failures are required in order for a punishment event to occur. If such a punishment will be
implemented, it will occur only after at least n− 1 queries events to agent A. (A longer
delay of n periods may occur if during this time agent B was punished.)
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As in Lemma 5.1, it is beneficial for agent A to attempt to answer a query, if and only
if its expected loss due to answering the query is not more than its losses due to ignoring
the query. i.e.,
oA + pAcA + (1− pA)ignr_lossA(ω, k,n,history) ignr_lossA(ω, k,n,history).
Thus, an equilibrium exists if,
ignr_lossA(ω, k,n,history) cA +
oA
pA
.
Now, consider a history different from best_caseA(k,n). There may be three possible
situations of histories:
(1) There is at least one unanswered query in the n− 1 last queries of agent A, but not in
the n− k last queries. The history of agent B is the same as in best_caseA(k,n).
(2) There is at least one unanswered query in the n−k last queries of agent A. The history
of agent B is the same as in best_caseA(k,n).
(3) The history of agent B contains at least one success in the last k − 1 events.
First, consider case (1). Since there is no unanswered query by A in the n − k last
queries, if agent B will not answer the current query, then a possible punishment may
happen only after additional k − 1 unanswered queries. Thus, case (1) is equivalent to
best_caseA(k,n).
Now, consider case (2). In any state with one failure or more in n−k last events of agent
A’s history, ignr_lossA(ω, k,n,history) will be higher than after the best_caseA(k,n)
history, since an unanswered query in the present may be concatenated to the other failures,
and causes a punishment after a shorter delay than in best_caseA(k,n).
Finally, consider case (3). In any case with one success or more in the last k− 1 queries
to agent B’s history, the probability of punishment of agent B is lower than after the
best_caseA(k.n) history, since more than one failure of agent B in the near n− k queries
is required in order to punish it. Any punishment of agent B causes a delay in the answers
required by agent A. Thus, if the probability of punishing agent B decreases, the expected
delay of the time when agent A will be punished increases, so ignr_lossA(ω, k,n,history)
also increases.
To summarize, ignr_lossA(ω, k,n,history) for any given history, is higher than or equal
to ignr_lossA(ω, k,n,best_caseA(k,n)). Thus, if ignr_lossA(ω,n,best_caseA(k,n)) >
cA + oA/pA. This will also hold for the other histories.
In other words, if it is beneficial for agent A to use the equilibrium strategies after the
history of best_caseA(k,n), it will be beneficial for it to use this strategy given any other
history. Symmetrically, we can also prove that if it is beneficial for agent B to use the
equilibrium strategies given the history of best_caseB(k,n), agent B will be motivated to
use this strategy given any other history. Combining these two results, we can conclude
that if the equilibrium exists both for best_caseA(k,n) and best_caseB(k,n), it will also
exist after any history.
Finally, if an equilibrium exists, then each agent will attempt to answer the query
of its opponent. In particular, each agent will do this given the particular history of
best_casei (k, n). ✷
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Proof of Lemma 5.6. Consider the history of best_casei (k, n), and increasing k to k + 1.
This will decrease the probability of punishment of agent i after an event of ignorance,
since in the best_casei (k, n) history it has no considerable failures. Moreover, the possible
punishment, if performed, will be done later (after at least k additional failures instead
of k − 1 additional failures), and this will decrease the present value of the loss due to
punishment.
However, best_casei (k, n) also depends on k. best_casei (k − 1, n) is different from
best_casei (k, n), and it includes k − 2 consequent failures of agent j instead of k − 1 (in
order to avoid immediate punishment when checking stability). Thus, as k decreases, the
probability of punishment of agent j remains unchanged. (Punishment will be inflicted
given one more query to agent j that is unanswered.) Thus, enlarging k while changing
best_casei respectively, causes the threat of punishment of agent j to decrease, while the
time and probability of punishing agent i remains unchanged. ✷
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Consider a strategy profile where punishment is performed after
k2 unanswered queries from n, and consider a configuration ω for which an equilibrium
exists. Since an equilibrium exists,
ignr_lossA(ω, k2, n,best_caseA(k2, n)) > oA + cApA.
Now consider k1= k2− x . According to Lemma 5.6,
ignr_lossA
(
ω,k,n,best_caseA(k,n)
)
> ignr_lossA
(
ω,k + 1, n,best_caseA(k + 1, n)
)
.
By transitivity, also
ignr_lossA
(
ω,k,n,best_caseA(k,n)
)
> ignr_lossA
(
ω,k + x,n,best_caseA(k + x,n)
)
.
So,
ignr_lossA
(
ω,k1, n,best_caseA(k1, n)
)
> ignr_lossA
(
ω,k2, n,best_caseA(k2, n)
)
.
Thus, ignr_lossA(ω, k1, n,best_caseA(k1, n)) > oA/pA + cA.
Symmetrically, for agent B , we can also prove that if
ignr_lossB
(
ω,k2, n,best_caseB(k2, n)
)
> oB + cBpB
then
ignr_lossB
(
ω,k1, n,best_caseB(k1, n)
)
>
oB
pB
+ cB.
Combining these two properties, the conclusion is that if an equilibrium exists for k2, it
will also exist for k1 < k2. ✷
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